Preserving hegemony? Assessing the political origins of the EU Constitution

International Journal of Constitutional Law

Volumn 3, Issue 2-3, 2005, Pages 269-291

  Hirschl, Ran ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO   (Canada)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33746359364     PISSN: 14742640     EISSN: 14742659     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/icon/moi020     Document Type: Article

References (54)

1. See Bruce Ackerman, We the People: Foundations (Harvard Univ. Press 1991).
2. The literature on the ECJ-initiated, gradual quasi constitutionalization of the EC legal order is too vast to cite. The thematic focus of this branch of scholarship is on the role of the ECJ in the process of European integration. The seminal account is Joseph H. H. Weiler, The Transformation of Europe, 100 Yale L.J. 2403 (1991). The distinct features of the current attempt to adopt a formal, comprehensive EU constitution, the draft Constitution, etc. are discussed in European Constitutionalism Beyond The State (J. H. H. Weiler and Marlene Wind eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 2003).
3. Ran Hirschl, Towards Juristocracy: The Origins and Consequences of the New Constitutionalism (Harvard Univ. Press 2004).
4. Simone Chambers, Democracy, Popular Sovereignty, and Constitutional Legitimacy, 11 Constellations 153 (2004).
5. See, e.g., Philippe C. Schmitter, How to Democratize the European Union... And Why Bother (2000).
6. See, e.g., Dieter Grimm, "Does Europe Need a Constitution?" 1 Eur.L.J. 282 (1995).
7. Dieter Grimm, address at the University of Toronto Constitutional Roundtable (Mar. 15, 2004).
8. The most prominent exponent of this line of thought is Ronald Dworkin. See, e.g., Ronald Dworion, A Bill of Rights for Britain 13-23 (1990)
9. Taking Rights Seriously 147-149 (1978).
10. See generally Jon Elster, Ulysses and the Sirens: Studies in Rationality and Irrationality 36-111 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1979)
11. Stephen Holmes, Passions and Constraint: On the Theory of Liberal Democracy 134-177 (Univ. of Chicago Press 1995)
12. Jeremy Waldron, Law and Disagreement (Oxford Univ. Press 1998).
13. See Martin Shapiro, The Success of Judicial Review and Democracy, in On Law, Politics, and Judicialization (Martin Shapiro & Alec Stone Sweet eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2002). According to this thesis, constitutional courts tend to be more powerful in polities requiring them to police federalism or separation-of-powers boundaries.
14. See Carlo Guarnieri & Patrizia Pederzoli, The Power of Judges; A Comparative Study or Courts and Democracy 160-181 (C.A. Thomas ed., Oxford Univ. Press 2002).
15. The works that adopt various versions of this approach are too numerous to cite. However, some of the most prominent exponents of this line of thought are Donald Horowitz, Arend Lijphart, and Yash Ghai.
16. See Malcolm M. Feeley & Edward L. Rubin, Judicial Policy Making and the Modern State: How the Courts Reformed America's Prisons 22-25 (Cambridge Studies in Criminology 1998).
17. See Alec Stone Sweet & Thomas Brunell, Constructing a Supranational Constitution: Dispute Resolution and Governance in the European Community, 92 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 63, 65 (1998).
18. Andrew Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht 7 (Cornell Univ. Press 1998).
19. See Douglass C. North & Barry R. Weingast, Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England, 49 J. of Econ. Hist. 803 (1989)
20. Barry Weingast, Constitutions as Governance Structures: The Political Foundations of Secure Markets, 149 J. of Institutional & Theoretical Econ. 286 (1993).
21. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an Interest Group Perspective, 18 J.L. & Econ. 875 (1975).
22. See J. Mark Ramseyer, The Puzzling (In)Dependence of Courts: A Comparative Approach, 23 J. Legal Stud. 721 (1994).
23. See Terry M. Moe, Political Institutions: The Neglected Side of the Story, 6 J.L. Econ. & Org. 213, 227 (1990).
24. Tom Ginsburg, Judicial Review in New Democracies: Constitutional Courts in Asian Cases 200-201 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2003).
25. This logic has been forcefully put forth and cleverly drawn upon to explain variance in judicial power among new Asian democracies (Taiwan, Mongolia, and South Korea), and among southern European democracies (Greece, Portugal, and Spain).
26. See id.; Pedro Magalhaes, The Limits to Judicialization: Legislative Politics and Constitutional Review in the Iberian Democracies (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Ohio State University 2002).
27. See, e.g., John B. Goodman, The Politics of Central Bank Independence, 23 Comp. Pol. 329, 333 (1991).
28. See Hirschl, supra note 3 at 50-99, for a detailed discussion of these illustrations of the hegemony preservation thesis in action.
29. See Id. at 27-30, 89-99
30. Heinz Klug, Constituting Democracy: Law, Globalism, and South Africa's Political Reconstruction (Cambridge Univ. Press 2000).
31. Ran Hirschl, Constitutional Courts vs. Religious Fundamentalism: Three Middle Eastern Tales, 82 Tex. L. Rev. 1819 (2004).
32. See Geoffrey Garrett, The Politics of Legal Integration in the European Union, 49 Int'l Org. 171 (1995).
33. See also, Geoffrey Garrett et al., The European Court of Justice, National Governments and Legal Integration in the European Union, 52 Int'l Org. 149 (1998).
34. See Lisa Conant, Justice Constrained: Law and Politics in the European Union (Cornell Univ. Press 2002).
35. See, e.g., Andrew Moravcsik, The Origins of Human Rights Regimes, 54 Int'l. Org. 217 (2000).
36. Miles Kahler, The Causes and Consequences of Legalization, 54 Int'l Org. 661, 663 (2000).
37. Moravcsik, supra note 28, at 220.
38. Poland's population alone (40 million) accounts for half of that increase. The combined population of the four biggest accession countries (Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovakia) accounts for nearly 70 million of the 80 million new EU citizens.
39. Those pesky Poles, The Economist, Nov. 27, 2003.
40. See Jan Zielonka and Peter Mair, Introduction: Diversity and Adaptation in the Enlarged European Union, in The Enlarged European Union: Diversity and Adaptation 1 (Jan Zielonka and Peter Mair eds., Frank Cass 2002).
41. Id.
42. Giuliano Amato and Judy Batt, Final Report of the Reflection Group on The Long-term Implications of EU Enlargement: The Nature of the New Border 11 (1999),
43. cited in Zielonka and Mair, supra note 33, at 3.
44. Claims that new constitution is designed to cope with European Union expansion are false, The Economist, Oct. 9, 2003.
45. Id.
46. EU Expansion: Immigrants refusing to work will be thrown out, Fin. Times (London), Feb. 4, 2004.
47. Agence France Press, Outline of EU enlargement restrictions planned by current members, Feb. 8, 2004. See also Information on the transitional rules governing the free movement of workers from, to and between the new member states at http://europa.eu.int/eures/ main.jsp?lang=en&acro=free&step=0.
48. Might it all tumble down? The Economist, Dec. 11, 2003.
49. See, e.g., Gretchen Helmke, The Logic of Strategic Defection: Court-Executive Relations in Argentina Under Dictatorship and Democracy, 96 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 291 (2002)
50. Lee Epstein et al., The Role of Constitutional Courts in the Establishment and Maintenance of Democratic Systems of Government, 35 L. & Soc. Rev. 117 (2001)
51. Karen Alter, Establishing the Supremacy of European Law: The Making of an International Rule of law in Europe (Oxford Univ. Press 2001).
52. See the oft-cited ECJ's landmark rulings Case-C 26/62, Van Gend and Loos, [1963] E.C.R. 1
53. and Case-C 6/64, Costa v. Enel, [1964] E.C.R. 585.
54. Attributed to Lyndon B. Johnson, thirty-sixth president of the United States.