Establishing judicial independence in West Germany: The impact of opinion leadership and the separation of powers

Comparative Politics

Volumn 32, Issue 3, 2000, Pages 333-353

  Vanberg, Georg ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0040630041     PISSN: 00104159     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/422370     Document Type: Article

References (81)

1. Christine Landfried, ed., Constitutional Review and Legislation (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1988);
2. Martin Shapiro and Alec Stone, eds., Special Issue: The New Constitutional Politics of Europe, Comparative Political Studies, 26 (1994);
3. Mary Volcansek, ed., Special Issue: Judicial Politics and Policy-making in Western Europe, West European Politics, 15 (1992).
4. Alexander Hamilton, "Federalist 78," in The Federalist Papers (New York: Mentor, 1961), p. 465.
5. Gregory Caldeira, "Neither the Purse nor the Sword: Dynamics of Public Confidence in the Supreme Court," American Political Science Review, 80 (1986), 1209-26;
6. Gregory Caldeira, "Public Opinion and the U.S. Supreme Court: FDR's Court Packing Plan," American Political Science Review, 81 (1987), 1139-53;
7. James Gibson, Gregory Caldeira, and Vanessa Baird, "On the Legitimacy of National High Courts," American Political Science Review, 92 (1998), 343-58;
8. Gregory Caldeira and James Gibson, "The Legitimacy of the European Court of Justice in the European Union: Models of Institutional Support," American Political Science Review, 89 (1995), 356-76.
9. Caldeira, "Neither the Purse nor the Sword," p. 1209.
10. For a game-theoretic treatment of electoral punishment and judicial behavior, see Georg Vanberg, "The Politics of Constitutional Review" (Ph.D. diss., University of Rochester, 1999).
11. James Madison, "Federalist 51," in The Federalist Papers, p. 322.
12. Robert Clinton, "Game-Theory, Legal History, and the Origins of Judicial Review: A Revisionist Analysis of Marbury v. Madison," American Journal of Political Science, 38 (1994), 285-302;
13. Jack Knight and Lee Epstein, "On the Struggle for Judicial Supremacy," Law and Society Review, 30 (1996), 87-120.
14. Gibson, Caldeira, and Baird, p. 344.
15. Donald Kommers, "The Federal Constitutional Court in the German Political System," Comparative Political Studies, 26 (1994), 470.
16. Udo Wengst, Staatsaufbau und Regierungspraxis (Düsseldorf: Droste, 1984), p. 325.
17. For example, see Gibson, Caldeira, and Baird, and Caldeira and Gibson.
18. Gary King, Robert Keohane, and Sidney Verba, Designing Social Inquiry (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), p. 211.
19. Bundestag Drucksache I/3371. See also Richard Häussler, Der Konflikt zwischen Bundesverfassungsgericht und politischer Führung (Berlin: Duncker und Humblot, 1993).
20. Stiftung Bundeskanzler-Adenauer-Haus [hereafter StBkAH] III/24.
21. K. Jena, ed., Die Kabinettsprotokolle der Bundesregierung: Band 5: 1952 (Boppard am Rhein: Harald Boldt Verlag, 1989), p. 245.
22. Die Kabinettsprotokolle der Bundesregierung: Band 5: 1952 Ibid., p. 427.
23. The memorandum is reprinted in Gerhard Leibholz, Der Status des Bundesverfassungsgerichts: Gutachten, Denkschriften und Stellungnahmen, Jahrbuch des Öffentlichen Rechts der Gegenwart (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1957), pp. 44-49.
24. Häussler, p. 23.
25. Madison, p. 322.
26. During this period Bavaria was governed by a CSU-SPD-BHE coalition, while Baden-Württemberg was governed by an FDP/DVP-SPD-BHE coalition.
27. Verhandlungen des Deutschen Bundestages, p. I:9606ff.
28. Archiv für Christlich-Demokratische Politik [hereafter ACDP] VIII-001-284/4.
29. ACDP VII-001-284/4.
30. Wengst, pp. 291ff.; Arnulf Baring, Aussenpolitik in Adenauers Kanzlerdemokratie (Munich: Oldenbourg Verlag, 1969), pp. 171ff.
31. See, for example, Brentano's letters to Adenauer and Prälat Böhler complaining that the executive had overstepped its jurisdiction in assuring Höpker Aschoff's selection as court president. ACDP V-001-284/4.
32. Peter Pulzer, German Politics 1945-1995 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 55.
33. Otto Lenz, Im Zentrum der Macht: Das Tagebuch von Staatssekretär Otto Lenz 1951-1953 (Düsseldorf: Droste Verlag), p. 105; Wengst, p. 302.
34. Baring, p. 267.
35. Verhandlungen des Deutschen Bundesrates, pp. I:599ff.
36. Bundesrat Drucksache 475/52.
37. Bundestag Drucksache 1/4000.
38. U. Enders and K. Reiser, Die Kabinettsprotokolle der Bundesregierung: Band 6: 1953 (Boppard am Rhein: Harald Boldt Verlag, 1989), p. 317.
39. Verhandlungen des Deutschen Bundestages, p. I:12475,
40. Verhandlungen des Deutschen Bundesrates, pp. I:162ff.
41. Enders and Reiser, p. 327. The budget was passed on July 1 and contained an independent court budget.
42. Konrad Adenauer, Erinnerungen, Band 1: 1953-1955 (Stuttgart: Deutscher Bücherbund, 1966), p. 165.
43. Also, see Adenauer's Bundestag speech on the treaties. Verhandlungen des Deutschen Bundestages, p. I:11140.
44. Dennis Bark and David Gress, From Shadow to Substance 1945-1963 (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), p. 300;
45. Ludolf Herbst, Option für den Westen (Munich: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 1996), pp. 65ff.;
46. Kurt Sontheimer, Die Adenauer Āra (Munich: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 1991), pp. 32ff.;
47. Udo Löwke, Die SPD und die Wehrfrage 1949 bis 1955 (Bonn-Bad Godesberg: Verlag Neue Gesellschaft, 1976).
48. Quoted in Baring, p. 174.
49. Jena, ed., p. 169.
50. The FCC is divided into two senates with different jurisdictions.
51. Lenz, p. 268.
52. According to Wengst, p. 243, of the twelve judges in the first senate, seven were close to the SPD, four were close to the CDU/CSU, and one was neutral. In the second senate, three were close to the SPD, eight were close to the CDU/CSU, and one was neutral.
53. There has been some dispute over whether Adenauer influenced Heuss to request the advisory opinion. The publication of the cabinet protocols leaves little doubt. The cabinet resolved on June 6 to request that Heuss ask for the opinion. On June 10 Heuss' chief of staff reported to the cabinet that Heuss would do so. Jena, ed., pp. 367, 379.
54. Institut für Staatslehre und Politik, ed., Der Kampf um den Wehrbeitrag, Ergänzungsband (Munich: Isar Verlag, 1958), pp. 1-24. Even several high level members of Adenauer's administration were convinced that his constitutional argument was dubious. Lenz, pp. 480ff.
55. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Dec. 5, 6, 1952.
56. ACDP VIII 001-284/4.
57. Jena, ed., pp. 730ff.; Lenz, pp. 492ff.
58. There were unconfirmed reports at the time that Adenauer threatened Heuss with his resignation should Heuss refuse to withdraw. Süddeutsche Zeitung, Dec. 11, 1952.
59. H. J. Küsters ed., Konrad Adenauer: Teegespräche 1950-1954 (Rhöndorf: Siedler Verlag, 1984), pp. 365, 377.
60. Verhandlungen des Deutschen Bundestages, p. I:11650.
61. Bulletin des Presseund Informationsamtes der Bundesregierung, 198/1731. "Does this last decision not confirm a development in which, increasingly, an institution that is not elected, is not controlled by the public, and has no political function is supposed to gain the right to pass law? The question arises whether the current institutional structure of the FCC is appropriate for its real task."
62. A notable exception is the weekly Die Zeit, which was critical of the court's plenum decision. See Die Zeit, Dec. 11, 18, 1952.
63. The editorial in the Süddeutsche Zeitung, Dec. 10, 1952, was particularly strong. "It may be that the decision of the justices in Karlsruhe was bold. Nevertheless, they were merely protecting themselves against the kind of serious abuse that is reflected in the fact that every politician dares to speak of a 'red' and a 'black' senate. Höpker Aschoff was right to resist any suspicions and arbitrary interpretations that would be punished as 'contempt of court' in any other state. It was high time for this warning, for if things continue in this way, this constitutional dispute will yet bring us to the brink of a crisis of state."
64. See also Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Dec. 10, 1952.
65. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung and Süddeutsche Zeitung, Dec. 12, 13, 1952.
66. Der Spiegel, Dec. 17, 1952.
67. Lenz, p. 500.
68. G. Buchstab, ed., Die Protokolle des CDU-Bundesvorstandes 1950-1953 (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta Verlag, 1986), p. 206.
69. Bulletin, Nr. 203/1770.
70. Bulletin, Nr. 203/1770. Ibid.
71. Bulletin, Nr. 205/1785.
72. This memorandum has, to my knowledge, not been published before.
73. ACDP I-172-58/2.
74. The motions had been introduced by the SPD in December 1952. Bundestag Drucksachen I/3874 and I/3955. The only member of the government who maintained his defiant attitude towards the court was Dehler. Verhandlungen des Deutschen Bundestages, pp. I:12099ff. Höpker Aschoff immediately went on the offensive against Dehler by giving a radio address.
75. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung and Süddeutsche Zeitung, Mar. 16, 1953. When Adenauer was forming his second cabinet in fall 1953, Höpker Aschoff and Heuss intervened to prevent Dehler's reappointment.
76. Buchstab, ed., pp. 522ff.
77. The CDU/CSU captured 244 out of 487 seats (one CDU/CSU deputy was elected via the Zentrum list).
78. See Adenauer's remarks to the CDU leadership following the election. "If we include the BHE - provided it is not too expensive - it would have the following advantage: we will have a two-thirds majority in the Bundestag. We may need the two-thirds majority to bring the affair with the Federal Constitutional Court to a close." G. Buchstab, ed., Die Protokolle des CDU-Bundesvorstandes 1953-1957 (Düsseldorf: Droste Verlag, 1990), p. 7.
79. The European Defense Community controversy died in August 1954, when the French assembly refused to ratify the treaties. The Paris treaties of October 1954 paved the way for German sovereignty and NATO membership.
80. Lenz, p. 500.
81. See also Gad Barzilai and Itai Sened, "How Do Courts Establish Political Status and How Do They Lose It: An Institutional Perspective of Judicial Strategies," paper presented at the 1997 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association.