Advancing Evolutionary Explanations in Economics: The Limited Usefulness of Tinbergen's Four-Question Classification

The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Economics

Volumn , Issue , 2009, Pages

  Vromen, Jack ^a  

^a ERASMUS UNIVERSITY ROTTERDAM   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

Behavior; Economics; Evolutionary explanations; Mayr; Niko tinbergen

Indexed keywords

EID: 84923279302     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195189254.003.0012     Document Type: Chapter

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