The sense of self in the phenomenology of agency and perception

Psyche (Pasadena)

Volumn 13, Issue 2007, 2007, Pages

  Hohwy, Jakob ^a  

^a MONASH UNIVERSITY   (Australia)

Author keywords

Agency; Default mode; Delusions; Generative models; Minimal self; Narrative self; Predictive coding; Psychopathology; Visual perception

Indexed keywords

EID: 84923132339     PISSN: None     EISSN: 1039723X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (60)

1. Bargh, J. and T.L. Chartrand (1999). The unbearable automaticity of being. American Psychologist 54: 462-479.
2. Blakemore, S.-J. and C. Frith (2003). Self-awareness and action. Current Opinion in Neurobiology 13(2): 219-224.
3. Blakemore, S.-J., D.W. Wolpert & C. Frith (2002). Abnormalities in the awareness of action. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 6: 237-242.
4. Block, N. (2005). Review of Alva Noe, “Action in Perception”. The Journal of Philosophy CII(5): 259-272.
5. Boyer, P., P. Robbins & A.I. Jack (2005). Varieties of self-systems worth having. Consciousness and Cognition 14(4): 647.
6. de Vignemont, F. and P. Fourneret (2004). The sense of agency: A philosophical and empirical review of the "Who" system. Consciousness and Cognition 13(1): 1.
7. Dennett, D. (1992). The Self as a Center of Narrative Gravity. Self and Consciousness: Multiple Perspectives. F. Kessel, P. Cole and D. Johnson. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
8. Eliasmith, C. (2003). Moving beyond metaphors: Understanding the mind for what it is. Journal of Philosophy C(10): 493-520.
9. Fox, M.D., A.Z. Snyder, J.L. Vincent, M. Corbetta, D.C. van Essen, M.E. Raichle (2005). The human brain is intrinsically organized into dynamic, anticorrelated functional networks. PNAS 102(27): 9673-9678.
10. Friston, K. (2002). Functional integration and inference in the brain. Progress in Neurobiology 68: 113-143.
11. Friston, K. (2003). Learning and inference in the brain. Neural Networks 16(9): 13251352.
12. Friston, K. (2005). A theory of cortical responses. Philosophical Transactions: Biological Sciences 369(1456): 815-836.
13. Frith, C. (2005). The self in action: Lessons from delusions of control. Consciousness and Cognition 14(4): 752.
14. Frith, C., S.-J. Blakemore, D.M. Wolpert (2000). Explaining the symptoms of schizophrenia: Abnormalities in the awareness of action. Brain Research Reviews 31: 357-363.
15. Frith, C. (1992). The Cognitive Neuropsychology of Schizophrenia. Hillsdale, NJ, Lawrence Erlbaum Ass.
16. Frith, C. and D.J. Done (1989). Experiences of alien control in schizophrenia reflect a disorder in the central monitoring of action. Psychological Medicine 19: 359-363.
17. Gallagher, S. (2000). Philosophical conceptions of the self: Implications for cognitive science. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 4(1): 14.
18. Gallagher, S. (2005). How the Body Shapes the Mind. Oxford, Oxford University Press.
19. Gallagher, S. and D. Zahavi. (2005). Phenomenological approaches to selfConsciousness. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Spring 2005. From http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2005/entries/self-consciousness-phenomenological/.
20. Gerrans, P. (2001). Delusions as performance failures. Cognitive Neuropsychiatry 3: 161173.
21. Gerrans, P. (Forthcoming). Hostage to experience: How delusions monopolise the mental economy.
22. Gregory, R.L. (1980). Perceptions as hypotheses. Phil. Trans. R. Soc. Lond., Series B, Biological Sciences 290(1038): 181-197.
23. Grush, R. (2004). The emulation theory of representation: motor control, imagery, and perception. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27: 377-442.
24. Grush, R. (Forthcoming). How to, and how not to, bridge computational cognitive neuroscience and Husserlian phenomenology of time consciousness.
25. Gusnard, D.A. (2005). Being a self: Considerations from functional imaging. Consciousness and Cognition 14(4): 679.
26. Gusnard, D.A., E. Akbudak, G.L. Shulman & M.E. Raichle (2001). Medial prefrontal cortex and self-referential mental activity: Relation to a default mode of brain function. PNAS 98(7): 4259-4264.
27. Gusnard, D.A. and M.E. Raichle (2001). Searching for a baseline: Functional imaging and the resting human brain. Nature Reviews Neuroscience 2: 685.
28. Haggard, P. and M. Eimer (1999). On the relation between brain potentials and awareness of voluntary movements. Experimental Brain Research 126: 128-133.
29. Helmholtz, H. V. (1860). Treatise on Physiological Optics. New York, Dover.
30. Henson, R.N.A. (2003). Neuroimaging studies of priming. Progress in Neurobiology 70(1): 53.
31. Hohwy, J. (2004a). The experience of mental causation. Behaviour and Philosophy 32: 377-400.
32. Hohwy, J. (2004b). Top-down and bottom-up in delusion formation. Philosophy, Psychiatry and Psychology 11(1): 65-70.
33. Hohwy, J. and C.D. Frith (2004). Can neuroscience explain consciousness? Journal of Consciousness Studies 11(7-8): 180-198.
34. Hohwy, J. and R. Rosenberg (2005). Unusual experiences, reality testing, and delusions of control. Mind & Language 20(2): 141-162.
35. Jeannerod, M. and E. Pacherie (2004). Agency, simulation and self-identification. Mind and Language 19(2): 113-146.
36. Kersten, D., P. Mamassian, A. Yuille (2004). Object perception as Bayesian inference. Annual Review of Psychology 55(1): 271-304.
37. Libet, B. (1985). Unconscious cerebral initiative and the role of conscious will in voluntary action. The Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8: 529-566.
38. Libet, B., C.A. Gleason, E.W. Wright, D.K. Pearl (1983). Time of conscious intention to act in relation to onset of cerebral activity (readiness potential): The unconscious initiation of a freely voluntary act. Brain 106: 623-642.
39. Maccotta, L. and R.L. Buckner (2004). Evidence for neural effects of repetition that directly correlate with behavioral priming. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience 16(9): 1625-1632.
40. MacKay, D. M. (1956). The epistemological problem for automata. Automata studies. C. E. Shannon and J. McCarthy. Princeton, Princeton University Press: 235-251.
41. Marchetti, C. and S. Della Salla (1998). Disentangling the alien and anarchic hand. Cognitive Neuropsychiatry 3: 191-208.
42. Mumford, D. (1992). On the computational architecture of the neocortex. Biological Cybernetics 66(3): 241.
43. Murray, S.O., D. Kersten, B.A. Olshausen, P. Schracter, D.L. Woods (2002). Shape perception reduces activity in human primary visual cortex. Proceedings of the National Academy of Science 99(23): 15164-15169.
44. Neisser, U. (1967). Cognitive psychology. New York, Appleton-Century-Crofts.
45. Noe, A. (2004). Action in Perception. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
46. Noe, A. and K. O'Regan (2001). A sensorimotor account of vision and visual consciousness. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24: 939-973.
47. Parnas, J., L. Jansson, L.A Sass, P. Handest (1998). Self-experience in the prodromal phases of schizophrenia: A pilot study of first admissions. Neurology, Psychiatry and Brain Research 6: 97-106.
48. Raichle, M.E., A.M. MacLeod, A.Z. Snyder, W.J. Powers, D.A. Gusnard, G.L. Shulman (2001). A default mode of brain function. PNAS 98(2): 676-682.
49. Ramnani, N. and A.M. Owen (2004). Anterior prefrontal cortex: insights into function from anatomy and neuroimaging. Nature Reviews Neuroscience 5(3): 184-94.
50. Rao, R.P. and D.H. Ballard (1999). Predictive coding in the visual cortex: a functional interpretation of some extra-classical receptive-field effects. Nature Neuroscience 2: 79.
51. Rao, R.P., B.A. Olshausen, M.S. Lewicki (eds). (2002). Probabilistic Models of the Brain. Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press.
52. Sass, L.S. and J. Parnas (2003). Schizophrenia, consciousness and the self. Schizophrenia Bulletin 29(3): 427-444.
53. Shoemaker, S. (1963). Self-Knowledge and Self-Identity. Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press.
54. Shulman, G. L., J.A. Fiez, M. Corbetta, R.L. Buckner, F.M. Miezin, M.E. Raichle, S.E. Petersen (1997). Common blood flow changes across visual Tasks: II. Decreases in cerebral cortex. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience 9(5): 648-663.
55. Spence, S.A., D.J. Brooks, S.R. Hirsch, P.F. Liddle, J. Meehan, P.G. Grasby (1997). A PET study of voluntary movement in schizophrenic patients experiencing passivity phenomena (delusions of alien control). Brain 120: 1997-2011.
56. Stephens, G. L. and G. Graham (2000). When Self-Consciousness Breaks: Alien Voices and Inserted Thoughts. Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press.
57. Wegner, D.M. (2002). The Illusion of Conscious Will. Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press.
58. Wolpert, D.M., K. Doya, & M. Kawato (2003). A unifying computational framework for motor control and social interaction. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society London B 358: 593-602.
59. Wolpert, D.M., Z. Ghahramani, & J.R. Flanagan (2001). Perspectives and problems in motor learning. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 5(11): 487.
60. Zahavi, D. (2006). Subjectivity and Selfhood: Investigating the First-Person Perspective. Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press.