Moving beyond metaphors: Understanding the mind for what it is

Journal of Philosophy

Volumn 100, Issue 10, 2003, Pages 493-520

[No Author Info available]

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 6344291105     PISSN: 0022362X     EISSN: 19398549     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.5840/jphil2003100102     Document Type: Article

References (50)

1. The Language of Thought (New York: Crowell, 1975).
2. James L. McClelland and David E. Rumelhart, "Future Directions," in McClelland and Rumelhart, eds., Parallel Distributed Processing: Explorations in the Microstructure of Cognition, Volume 2 (Cambridge: MIT, 1986), pp. 547-52.
3. See Chapter 10 of William Bechtel and Adele Abrahamsen, Connectionism and the Mind: Parallel Processing, Dynamics, and Evolution in Networks, Second Edition (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2001).
4. "What Might Cognition Be, If Not Computation?" this JOURNAL, XCI, 7 (July 1995): 345-81.
5. See, for example, Paul Smolensky's "On the Proper Treatment of Connectionism," Behavioral and Brain Sciences, XI, 1 (1988): 1-23.
6. For a detailed description of the analogies, predictions, and experiments, see Chris Eliasmith and Paul Thagard, "Particles, Waves and Explanatory Coherence," British Journal of the Philosophy of Science, XLVIII (1997): 1-19.
7. For a succinct description of the history of control theory, see Frank L. Lewis's Applied Optimal Control and Estimation (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1992).
8. For a statement of the motivations of cybernetics, see Arturo Rosenblueth, Norbert Wiener, and Julian Bigelow, "Behavior, Purpose, and Teleology," Philosophy of Science, X (1943): 18-24.
9. These papers include, but are not limited to: A. Newell, C. Shaw, and H. Simon, "Elements of a Theory of Human Problem Solving," Psychological Review, LXV (1958): 151-66;
10. G. Miller, "The Magical Number Seven, Plus or Minus Two: Some Limits on Our Capacity for Processing Information," Psychological Review, LXIII (1956): 81-97;
11. Jerome S. Bruner, Jacqueline Goodnow, and George Austin, A Study Of Thinking (New York: Wiley, 1956).
12. Psychosemantics (Cambridge: MIT, 1987), p. 18.
13. As discussed in both Smolensky and the introduction to Rumelhart and McClelland, eds. Parallel Distributed Processing: Explorations in the Microstructure of Cognition, Volume 1 (Cambridge: MIT, 1986).
14. See the various contributions to Robert F. Port and van Gelder, eds., Mind as Motion: Explorations in the Dynamics of Cognition (Cambridge: MIT, 1995), especially the editors' introduction.
15. This introduction is largely credited to R. Kalman in his "A New Approach to Linear Filtering and Prediction Problems," ASME Journal of Basic Engineering, LXXXII (1960): 35-45.
16. van Gelder, "What Might Cognition Be, If Not Computation?"
17. For an in-depth technical description of this approach, see Eliasmith and Charles H. Anderson, Neural Engineering: Computation, Representation and Dynamics in Neurobiological Systems (Cambridge: MIT, 2003).
18. See James M. Bower and David Beeman, The Book of GENESIS: Exploring Realistic Neural Models with the GEneral NEural SImulation System (Berlin: Springer, 1998) for a review of such models.
19. As demonstrated by Fred Rieke et al., Spikes: Exploring the Neural Code (Cambridge: MIT, 1997), pp. 76-87.
20. For an overview of this evidence, see Rieke et al.; Eliasmith and Anderson; and L. Abbott, "Decoding Neuronal Firing and Modelling Neural Networks," Quarterly Review of Biophysics, XXVII, 3 (1994): 291-331.
21. For instance, in order to understand the relation between representations at a given organizational level, we need to consider computational relations, as discussed in the next section. For an in-depth but preliminary discussion of a theory of content that is consistent with R&D theory, see my "How Neurons Mean: A Neurocomputational Theory of Representational Content" (Ph.D. diss., Washington University, St. Louis, 2000).
22. For a detailed description and review of these experiments and their results, see C. Colby and M. Goldberg, "Space and Attention in Parietal Cortex," Annual Review of Neuroscience, XXII (1999): 319-49
23. and R. Andersen, L. Snyder, D. Bradley, and J. Xing, "Multimodal Representation of Space in the Posterior Parietal Cortex and Its Use in Planning Movements," Annual Review of Neuroscience, XX (1997): 303-30.
24. As described in Z. Nenadic, Anderson, and B. Ghosh, "Control of Arm Movement Using a Population of Neurons," Mathematical and Computer Modelling, XXXV (2002): 1261-69.
25. Perhaps the most concerted effort to include time in such models is in Allen Newell's Unified Theories Of Cognition (Cambridge: Harvard, 1990).
26. This attempt, however, is both after-the-fact and largely inconsistent, as discussed in my "The Third Contender: A Critical Examination of the Dynamicist Theory of Cognition," Philosophical Psychology, IX, 4 (1996): 441-63.
27. As discussed in E. Smith, "Concepts and Induction," in Michael Posner, ed., Foundations of Cognitive Science (Cambridge: MIT, 1989), pp. 501-26.
28. This is made clear in the case of visual processes by P. Churchland, V. Ramachandran, and T. Sejnowski, "A Critique of Pure Vision," in Christof Koch and Joel L. Davis, eds., Large-Scale Neuronal Theories of the Brain (Cambridge: MIT, 1994), pp. 23-60.
29. This general point has been argued in J. Girard, "Proof-Nets: The Parallel Syntax for Proof-Theory," in Aldo Ursini and Paulo Agliano, eds., Logic and Algebra (New York: Marcel Dekker, 1996), pp. 97-124;
30. and J. Girard, "Linear Logic," Theoretical Computer Science, L, 1 (1987): 1-102.
31. "Connectionism and Cognitive Architecture: A Critical Analysis," Cognition, XXVIII (1988): 3-71.
32. As demonstrated in T. Plate, "Distributed Representations and Nested Compositional Structure" (Ph.D. diss., University of Toronto, 1994).
33. As in Eliasmith and Thagard, "Integrating Structure and Meaning: A Distributed Model of Analogical Mapping," Cognitive Science, XXV, 2 (2001): 245-86.
34. See the various discussions by the editors in McClelland and Rumelhart, eds., Parallel Distributed Processing: Explorations in the Microstructure of Cognition, Volume 2.
35. See the selection of the examples in Patricia S. Churchland and Terrence J. Sejnowski, The Computational Brain (Cambridge: MIT, 1992).
36. As argued by Bechtel and Robert C. Richardson in their Discovering Complexity: Decomposition and Localization as Strategies in Scientific Research (Princeton: University Press, 1993).
37. "Predictive Coding in the Visual Cortex: A Functional Interpretation of Some Extra-Classical Receptive-Field Effects," Nature Neuroscience, II, 1 (1999): 79-87.
38. Another high-level hypothesis regarding the use of the Kalman filter has been made in the context of the construction and use of cognitive maps in hippocampus in K. Balakrishnan, O. Bousquet, and V. Honavar, "Spatial Learning and Localization in Animals: A Computational Model and Its Implications for Mobile Robots," Adaptive Behavior, VII, 2 (1999): 173-216.
39. "Beyond Bumps: Spiking Networks that Store Smooth N-Dimensional Functions," Neurocomputing, XXXVIII (2001): 581-86.
40. As discussed in chapter 9 of Eliasmith and Anderson, Neural Engineering: Computation, Representation and Dynamics in Neurobiological Systems.
41. For a simple example, see Eliasmith and Anderson, Neural Engineering, pp. 294-98.
42. These are two of the lumped parameters included in the model of feeding described in J. Busemeyer and J. Townsend, "Decision Field Theory: A Dynamic-Cognitive Approach to Decision Making in an Uncertain Environment," Psychological Review, C, 3 (1993): 432-59.
43. These points are discussed in detail in my "Commentary: Dynamical Models and van Gelder's Dynamicism: Two Different Things," Behavioral and Brain Sciences, XXI, 5 (1998): 615-65, and my "The Third Contender: A Critical Examination of the Dynamicist Theory of Cognition."
44. Such arguments are prominent in both van Gelder's "What Might Cognition Be, If Not Computation?" and his "The Dynamical Hypothesis In Cognitive Science," Behavioral and Brain Sciences, XXI, 5 (1998): 615-65, and the various contributions to Port and van Gelder.
45. This view, associated variously with terms "embodied," "embedded," or "dynamicist" has been expressed in, for example, Francisco J. Varela, Evan Thompson, and Eleanor Rosch, The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience (Cambridge: MIT, 1991)
46. and more recently in Ballard, M. Hayhoe, P. Pook, and R. Rao, "Deictic Codes for the Embodiment of Cognition," Behavioral and Brain Sciences, in press.
47. Knowledge and the Flow of Information (Cambridge: MIT, 1981).
48. For an attempt at articulating such a theory, see my "How Neurons Mean: A Neurocomputational Theory of Representational Content."
49. "Philosophy and Our Mental Life," in his Mind, Language, and Reality: Philosophical Papers (New York: Cambridge, 1975), pp. 291-303.
50. These consequences are more fully explored in my "The Myth of the Turing Machine: The Failings of Functionalism and Related Theses," Journal of Experimental and Theoretical Artificial Intelligence, XIV (2002): 1-8.