How many dual-process theories do we need? One, two, or many?

In Two Minds: Dual Processes and Beyond

Volumn , Issue , 2012, Pages

  Evans, Jonathan St B T ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF PLYMOUTH   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Dual system theory; Psychology; Reasoning; Recognition; Type 1 processes; Type 2 processes

Indexed keywords

EID: 84922761284     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199230167.003.0002     Document Type: Chapter

References (80)

1. Ball, L.J., Wade, C.N., and Quayle, J.D. (2006) Effects of belief and logic on syllogistic reasoning: Eye-movement evidence for selective processing models. Experimental Psychology, 53, 77-86.
2. Bargh, J.A. (2006) (ed.) Social psychology and the unconscious. Psychology Press, New York.
3. Bargh, J.A. and Ferguson, M. J. (2000) Beyond behaviorism: On the automaticity of higher mental processes. Psychological Bulletin, 126, 925-45.
4. Barrett, H.C. and Kurzban, R. (2006) Modularity in cognition: Framing the debate. Psychological Review, 113, 628-47.
5. Barrett, L.F., Tugade, M.M., and Engle, R.W. (2004) Individual differences in working memory capacity and dual-process theories of the mind. Psychological Bulletin, 130, 553-73.
6. Carruthers, P. (2006) The architecture of the mind. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
7. Chaiken, S. (1980) Heuristic versus systematic information processing and the use of source versus message cues in in persuasion. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 39, 752-66.
8. Chen, S. and Chaiken, S. (1999) The heuristic-systematic model in its broader context. In S. Chaiken and Y. Trope (eds) Dual-process theories in social psychology, 73-96. Guilford Press, New York.
9. Colom, R., Rebollo, I., Palacios, A., Juan-Espinosa, M., and Kyllonen, P.C. (2004) Working memory is (almost) perfectly predicted by g. Intelligence, 32, 277-96.
10. Conrey, F.R., Gawronski, B., Sherman, J.W., Hugenberg, K., and Groom, C.J. (2005) Separating multiple processes in implicit social cognition: The quad model of implicit task performance. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 89, 469-87.
11. Cosmides, L. and Tooby, J. (1996) Are humans good intuitive statisticians after all? Rethinking some conclusions from the literature on judgment under uncertainty. Cognition, 58, 1-73.
12. Cosmides, L. and Tooby, J. (2000) Consider the source: The evolution of adaptations for decoupling and metarepresentation. In D. Sperber (ed.) Metarepresentations, 53-115. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
13. De Neys, W. (2006) Dual processing in reasoning: Two systems but one reasoner. Psychological Science, 17, 428-33.
14. De Neys, W. and Glumicic, T. (2007) Conflict monitoring in dual process theories of thinking. Cognition, 106, 1248-99.
15. Epstein, S. (1994) Integration ofthe cognitive and psychodynamic unconscious. American Psychologist, 49, 709-24.
16. Epstein, S. and Pacini, R. (1999) Some basic issues regarding dual-process theories from the perspective ofcognitive-experiential theory. In S. Chaiken and Y. Trope (eds) Dualprocess theories in social psychology, 462-82. Guildford Press, New York.
17. Evans, J.St.B.T. (1977) Toward a statistical theory of reasoning. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 29, 297-306.
18. Evans, J.St.B.T. (1984) Heuristic and analytic processes in reasoning. British Journal of Psychology, 75, 451-68.
19. Evans, J.St.B.T. (1989) Bias in human reasoning causes and consequences. Erlbaum, Brighton.
20. Evans, J.St.B.T. (2003) In two minds: Dual-process accounts of reasoning. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 7, 454-9.
21. Evans, J.St.B.T. (2005) How to do reserach: A psychologist's guide. Psychology Press, Hove.
22. Evans, J.St.B.T. (2006a) Dual-system theories of cognition: Some issues. Proceedings of the 28th Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society, Vancouver, 202-7.
23. Evans, J.St.B.T. (2006b) The heuristic-analytic theory of reasoning: Extension and evaluation. Psychonomic Bulletin and Review, 13, 378-95.
24. Evans, J.St.B.T. (2007a) Hypothetical thinking: Dual processes in reasoning and judgement. Psychology Press, Hove.
25. Evans, J.St.B.T. (2007b) On the resolution of conflict in dual-process theories of reasoning. Thinking & Reasoning, 13, 321-9.
26. Evans, J.St.B.T. (2008) Dual-processing accounts of reasoning, judgment and social cognition. Annual Review of Psychology, 59, 255-78.
27. Evans, J.St.B.T. and Curtis-Holmes, J. (2005) Rapid responding increases belief bias: Evidence for the dual-process theory of reasoning. Thinking & Reasoning, 11, 382-9.
28. Evans, J.St.B.T. and Over, D.E. (1996) Rationality and Reasoning. Psychology Press, Hove.
29. Evans, J.St.B.T., Barston, J.L., and Pollard, P. (1983) On the conflict between logic and belief in syllogistic reasoning. Memory & Cognition, 11, 295-306.
30. Evans, J.St.B.T., Over, D.E., and Handley, S.J. (2003) A theory of hypothetical thinking. In D. Hardman and L. Maachi (eds) Thinking: Psychological perspectives on reasoning, judgement and decision making, 3-22. Wiley, Chichester.
31. Evans, J.St.B.T. Handley, S.J., Harper, C., and Johnson-Laird, P.N. (1999) Reasoning about necessity and possibility: A test of the mental model theory of deduction. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory and Cognition, 25, 1495-513.
32. Evans, J.St.B.T., Handley, S.J., Perham, N., Over, D.E., and Thompson, V.A. (2000) Frequency versus probability formats in statistical word problems. Cognition, 77, 197-213.
33. Fodor, J. (1983) The Modularity of Mind. Crowell, Scranton, PA.
34. Fodor, J. (2001) The mind doesn't work that way. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
35. Forgas, J.P., Williams, K.R., and von Hippel, W. (2003) (eds) Social judgments: Implicit and explicit processes. Cambridge University Press, New York.
36. Frankish, K. (2004) Mind and supermind. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
37. Gilinsky, A.S. and Judd, B.B. (1994) Working memory and bias in reasoning across the lifespan. Psychology and Aging, 9, 356-71.
38. Girotto, V. and Gonzalez, M. (2001) Solving probabilistic and statistical problems: A matter of information structure and question form. Cognition, 78, 247-76.
39. Goel, V. (2005) Cognitive neuroscience of deductive reasoning. In K. Holyoak and R.G. Morrison (eds) The Cambridge handbook of thinking and reasoning, 475-92. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
40. Goel, V. (2007) Anatomy of deductive reasoning. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 11, 435-41.
41. Goel, V. and Dolan, R.J. (2003) Explaining modulation of reasoning by belief. Cognition, 87, B11-B22.
42. Goldstein, D.G. and Gigerenzer, G. (2002) Models of ecological rationality: The recognition heuristic. Psychological Review, 109, 75-90.
43. Hammond, K. R. (1996) Human judgment and social policy. Oxford University Press, New York.
44. Kahneman, D. and Frederick, S. (2002) Representativeness revisited: Attribute substitution in intuitive judgement. In T. Gilovich, D. Griffin, and D. Kahneman (eds) Heuristics and biases: The psychology of intuitive judgment, 49-81. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
45. Kahneman, D. and Frederick, S. (2005) A model of heuristic judgment. In K. Holyoak and R.G. Morrison (eds) The Cambridge handbook of thinking and reasoning, 267-94. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
46. Klaczynski, P.A. and Cottrell, J.M. (2004) A dual-process approach to cognitive development: The case of children's understanding of sunk cost decisions. Thinking and Reasoning, 10, 147-74.
47. Klauer, K.C., Musch, J., and Naumer, B. (2000) On belief bias in syllogistic reasoning. Psychological Review, 107, 852-84.
48. Klauer, K.C., Stahl, C., and Erdfelder, E. (2007) The abstract selection task: New data and an almost comprehensive model. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory and Cognition, 33, 680-703.
49. Krauth, J. (1982) Formulation and experimental verification of models in propositional reasoning. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 34A, 285-98.
50. Lieberman, M.D. (2003) Reflective and reflexive judgment processes: A social cognitive neuroscience approach. In J.P. Forgas, K.R. Williams, and W. von Hippel (eds) Social judgments: Implicit and explicit processes, 44-67. Cambridge University Press, New York.
51. Mithen, S. (1996) The prehistory of the mind. Thames and Hudson, London.
52. Newstead, S.E. (2000) Are there two different kinds of thinking? Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 23, 690-1.
53. Nisbett, R., Peng, K., Choi, I., and Norenzayan, A. (2001) Culture and systems of thought: Holistic vs analytic cognition. Psychological Review, 108, 291-310.
54. Oakhill, J., Johnson-Laird, P.N., and Garnham, A. (1989) Believability and syllogistic reasoning. Cognition, 31, 117-40.
55. Oppenheimer, D. M. (2003) Not so fast! (and not so frugal!): Rethinking the recognition heuristic. Cognition, 90, B1-B9.
56. Osman, M. (2004) An evaluation of dual-process theories of reasoning. Psychonomic Bulletin and Review, 11, 988-1010.
57. Over, D.E. (2003) From massive modularity to metarepresentation: The evolution of higher cogntion. In D.E.Over (ed.) Evolution and the psychology of thinking The debate, 121-44. Psychology Press, Hove.
58. Reber, A.S. (1993) Implicit Learning and Tacit Knowledge. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
59. Reyna, V. F. (2004) How people make decisions that involve risk: A dual-processes approach. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 13, 60-6.
60. Samuels, R. (2000) Massively modular minds: Evolutionary psychology and cognitive architecture. In P. Carruthers and A. Chamberlain (eds) Evolution and the human mind, 13-46. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
61. Sloman, S.A. (1996) The empirical case for two systems of reasoning. Psychological Bulletin, 119, 3-22.
62. Sloman, S.A. (2002) Two systems of reasoning. In T. Gilovich, D. Griffin, and D. Kahneman (eds) Heuristics and biases: The psychology of intuitive judgment, 379-98. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
63. Sloman, S.A., Over, D.E., and Slovack, L. (2003) Frequency illusions and other fallacies. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 91, 296-309.
64. Smith, E.R. and DeCoster, J. (2000) Dual-process models in social and cognitive psychology: Conceptual integration and links to underlying memory systems. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 4, 108-31.
65. Sperber, D. (2000) Metarepresentations in an evolutionary perspective. In D. Sperber (ed.) Metarepresentations, 117-38. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
66. Sperber, D. and Wilson, D. (1995) Relevance, 2nd ed. Basil Blackwell, Oxford.
67. Stanovich, K.E. (1999) Who is rational? Studies of individual differences in reasoning. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Mahwah, NJ.
68. Stanovich, K.E. (2004) The robot's rebellion: Finding meaning the age of Darwin. Chicago University Press, Chicago, IL.
69. Stanovich, K.E. and West, R.F. (2003) Evolutionary versus instrumental goals: How evolutionary psychology misconceives human rationality. In D.E. Over (ed.) Evolution and the psychology of thinking, 171-230. Psychology Press, Hove.
70. Stevenson, R.J. (1997) Deductive reasoning and the distinction between implicit and explicit processes. Current Psychology of Cognition, 16, 222-9.
71. Strack, F. and Deutsch, R. (2004) Reflective and impulsive determinants of social behavior. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 8, 220-47.
72. Toates, F. (2004) 'In two minds'-Consideration of evolutionary precursors permits a more integrative theory. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 8, 57.
73. Toates, F. (2006) A model of the hierarchy of behaviour, cognition and consciousness. Consciousness and Cognition, 15, 75-118.
74. Tooby, J. and Cosmides, L. (1992) The psychological foundations of culture. In J.H. Barkow, L. Cosmides, and J. Tooby (eds) The adapted mind: Evolutionary psychology and the generation of culture, 19-136. Oxford University Press, New York.
75. Velmans, M. (2000) Understanding consciousness. Routledge, London.
76. Verschueren, N., Schaeken, W., and d'Ydewalle, G. (2005) A dual-process specification of causal conditional reasoning. Thinking & Reasoning, 11, 239-78.
77. Wason, P.C. and Evans, J.St.B.T. (1975) Dual processes in reasoning? Cognition, 3, 141-54.
78. Wegner, D. M. (2002) The illusion of conscious will. MIT Books, Cambridge, MA.
79. Weidenfeld, A., Oberauer, K., and Hornig, R. (2005) Causal and noncausal conditionals: An integrated model of interpretation and reasoning. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 58, 1479-513
80. Wilson, T.D. (2002) Strangers to ourselves: Discovering the adaptive unconscious. Belknap Press, Cambridge, MA.