Perception and its Objects

Perception and its Objects

Volumn , Issue , 2011, Pages 1-224

  Brewer, Bill ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WARWICK   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Content; Direct object; Empirical realism; Empiricism; Hallucination; Illusion; Look; Mind independent; Perception; Perceptual experience; Physical object; Realism

Indexed keywords

EID: 84921945644     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199260256.001.0001     Document Type: Book

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