Self-Knowing Agents

Self-Knowing Agents

Volumn , Issue , 2007, Pages 1-240

  O'Brien, Lucy ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY COLLEGE LONDON   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Agents; First person reference; Mind and action; Philosophy; Self knowledge; Self reference

Indexed keywords

EID: 78650044358     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199261482.001.0001     Document Type: Book

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