Malpractice law, physicians’ financial incentives, and medical treatment: How do they interact?

Journal of Law and Economics

Volumn 57, Issue 1, 2014, Pages 1-29

  Shurtz, Ity ^a  

^a HEBREW UNIVERSITY OF JERUSALEM   (Israel)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84920926877     PISSN: 00222186     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1086/674408     Document Type: Article

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