Responsibilitys1

The Moral Psychology Handbook

Volumn , Issue , 2010, Pages

  Knobe, Joshua ^a   Doris, John M ^b  

^a YALE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Compatibilism; Free will; Invariantism; Moral responsibility; Real self view

Indexed keywords

EID: 84920918925     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199582143.003.0011     Document Type: Chapter

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