Creating dialogue about socioeconomic rights: Strong-form versus weak-form judicial review revisited

International Journal of Constitutional Law

Volumn 5, Issue 3, 2007, Pages 391-418

  Dixon, Rosalind ^a  

^a HARVARD LAW SCHOOL   (United States)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 34547941483     PISSN: 14742640     EISSN: 14742659     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/icon/mom021     Document Type: Review

References (191)

1. Government of the Republic of South Africa v. Grootboom [hereinafter Grootboom] 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC) (S. Afr.).
2. Second-generation or socioeconomic rights are generally those associated with the rights protected by the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), and first-generation rights with those protected by the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). The distinction is, of course, somewhat artificial: cf. Terence Daintith, The Constitutional Protection of Economic Rights, 2 INT'L J. CONST. L. (I•CON) 56, 57-64 (2004)
3. Nicholas Haysom, Constitutionalism, Majoritarian Democracy and Socioeconomic Rights, 8 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 451, 457 (1992) However, it remains helpful as a form of shorthand in referring to various rights, if not as a conceptual organizing device.
4. Cass R. Sunstein, Social and Economic Rights? Lessons from South Africa, 11 CONST. FORUM 123 (2000).
5. See, e.g., Dennis Davis, Socioeconomic Rights in South Africa: The Record of the Constitutional Court after Ten Years, 5 ESR REV. 3, 5 (2004)
6. Karrisha Pillay, Implementing Grootboom: Supervision Needed, 3 ESR REV. 13 (2002).
7. For the concept of judicial "weakness" in this context, see Mark Tushnet, New Forms of Judicial Review and the Persistence of Rights-and Democracy-Based Worries, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 813, 821, 835 (2003) [hereinafter New Forms of Review]
8. Mark Tushnet, Social Welfare Rights and the Forms of Judicial Review 82 TEX. L. REV. 1895 (2004) [hereinafter Social Welfare Rights].
9. For criticism of the Court's approach as too weak, see, for example, David Bilchitz, Giving Socioeconomic Rights Teeth: The Minimum Core and Its Importance, 119 S. AFR. L. J. 484 (2002) [hereinafter Giving SER Teeth]
10. David Bilchitz, Towards a Reasonable Approach to the Minimum Core: Laying the Foundations for Future Socioeconomic Rights Jurisprudence, 19 SAJHR 1 (2003) [hereinafter Future SER Jurisprudence]
11. Davis, supra note 4;
12. Thermis Roux, Understanding Grootboom - A Response to Cass R. Sunstein, 12 CONST. FORUM 41 (2002).
13. But see Mark S. Kende, The South African Constitutional Court's Construction of Socioeconomic Rights: A Response to Critics, 19 CONN. J. INT'L L. 617, 624 (2004).
14. Marius Pieterse, Coming to Terms With Judicial Enforcement of Socioeconomic Rights, 20 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 383 (2004).
15. See, e.g., Bilchitz, Giving SER Teeth and Future SER Jurisprudence, supra note 5;
16. Davis, supra note 4;
17. Roux, supra note 5
18. See, e.g., Bilchitz, Giving SER Teeth, and Future SER Jurisprudence, supra note 5.
19. For a comprehensive summary of this literature, see Kent Roach, Dialogic Judicial Review and its Critics, 23 S.C.L.R. (2d) 49 (2004).
20. See Stephen Gardbaum, The New Commonwealth Constitutionalism 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 707, 710 (2001).
21. See also Roach, id.
22. For exceptions to this general rule, see Craig Scott, Social Rights: Toward A Principled, Pragmatic Judicial Role, 4 ECON. & SOC. RTS. REV. (1999)
23. Murray Wesson, Grootboom and Beyond: Reassessing the Socioeconomic Jurisprudence of the South African Constitutional Court, 20 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 285, 295 (2004).
24. See Christine Bateup, The Dialogic Promise: Assessing the Normative Potential of Theories of Constitutional Dialogue, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 1109 (2006).
25. S. AFR. CONST. 1996, §26(2).
26. S. AFR. CONST. 1996, §29(1)(c).
27. Grootboom, supra note 1.
28. See discussion in 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC) at para. 14 (S.Afr.).
29. See discussion in 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC) at paras. 25-26 (S. Afr.).
30. See discussion in 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC) at paras. 28-33 (S. Afr.). This represented an extension of the interim relief previously granted by Josman AJ.
31. See discussion in 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC) at paras. 83-84 (S. Afr.).
32. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), General Comment No. 3: The Nature of States Parties Obligations, 5th Session (1990), at para. 10 [hereinafter CESCR, General Comment No. 3], available at http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(symbol)/ CESCR+General+comment+3.En?OpenDocument (last visited Feb. 16, 2006).
33. Grootboom, supra note 1, at paras. 32-33.
34. Id. at para. 99.
35. Id. at paras. 43-44.
36. Id. at para. 99.
37. 20Legacy.pdf (last visited Feb. 16, 2006).
38. Grootboom, supra note 1, at para. 99 (S. Afr.).
39. Cf. Tushnet, supra note 5.
40. Minister of Health and Others v. Treatment Action Campaign and Others, 2002 (10) BCLR 1033 (CC) (S. Afr.).
41. Id.
42. Treatment Action Campaign v. Minister of Health & Others [hereinafter TAC], 2002 (4) BCLR 356 (A) at paras. 75-76 (S. Afr.).
43. Id. at paras. 85-87.
44. Minister of Health and Others v. Treatment Action Campaign and Others, supra note 27, at para. 32.
45. Id. at para. 38.
46. Id. at para. 77.
47. Id. at para. 93.
48. Id. at para. 113.
49. One important factor to note here is that the government had taken steps to change its policy between the time of the initial hearing, and the hearing of the matter in the Constitutional Court.
50. See Khosa v. Minister of Social Development, 2004 (6) BCLR 569 (CC) (S. Afr.). It should be noted that in Khosa, the only case involving §26(2) and 27(2) to come before the Court since TAC the Court ultimately elected to consider the challenge primarily in terms of 9§(3) rather than 2§6(2).
51. See Marius Pieterse, Eating Socioeconomic Rights: The Usefulness of Rights-Talk in Alleviating Social Hardship Revisited, Paper presented at Conference on Comparative Constitutionalism, Durban, South Africa, (Dec. 10-13, 2005).
52. Kende, supra note 5, at 623.
53. On the limits to strictly originalist or contractualist understandings of constitutional provisions at a deeper level, see, for example, Frank I. Michelman,Constitutional Authorship, Solomonic Solutions, and the Unoriginalist Mode of Constitutional Interpretation, 62 ACTA JURIDICA 208 (1998).
54. For the centrality of this understanding in all theories of cooperative constitutionalism, or weak(ened) judicial review, see Mark Tushnet, Strong Rights, Weak Courts, paper presented at Harvard Law School Public Law Workshop, April 2005, at 49, 92.
55. See, e.g., Related Recognition for Housing Ministry's Fiat, FINANCIAL MAIL (South Africa), Nov. 20, 1998, at 14;
56. Housing Minister Needs Clear and Creative Mind, FINANCIAL MAIL (South Africa), Mar. 7, 2003, at 14.
57. See, e.g., Suthentira Govender, New Homes for Old,SUNDAY TIMES (South Africa), Dec. 8, 2002, at 4.
58. See, e.g., Claire Keeton, Activists Who Stare at Death, SUNDAY TIMES (South Africa), Oct. 12, 2003, at 6;
59. Lee-Ann Alfreds & Celean Jacobson, Long Walk to Save South African Lives,SUNDAY TIMES (South Africa), Aug. 10, 2003, at 4.
60. See, e.g., David Bullard, State's AIDS Stance Means it Wants a Lean and Mean Workforce, SUNDAY TIMES (South Africa), Mar. 31, 2002, at 6.
61. Bilchitz, Giving SER Teeth, and Future SER Jurisprudence, supra note 5, at 11-12.
62. For the link between socioeconomic rights and this conception of dignity, see, for example, Sandra Liebenberg, The Right to Social Assistance: The Implications of Grootboom for Policy Reform in South Africa, 17 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 232, 240-241 (2001)
63. Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1968 Term, Foreword: On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7, 8-9 (1969)
64. Danwood Nzikenge Chirwa, The Right to Health in International Law: Its Implications for Obligations of State and Non-State Actors in Ensuring Access to Essential Medicine, 19 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 541 (2003).
65. See Chirwa, supra note 47, at 544;
66. Sandra Liebenberg, The Value of Human Dignity in Interpreting Socioeconomic Rights, 21 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 1, 12 (2005).
67. See Pierre de Vos, Grootboom, the Right of Access to Housing and Substantive Equality as Contextual Fairness, 17 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 258, 265 (2001).
68. See also Khosa v. Minister of Social Development, supra note 37.
69. See JOHN RAWLS POLITICAL LIBERALISM 131-172 (Columbia Univ. Press 1993).
70. Cf. Liebenberg, supra note 48, at 22;
71. Craig Scott & Phillip Alston, Adjudicating Constitutional Priorities in a Transnational Context: A Comment on Soobramoney's Legacy and Grootboom's Promise, 16 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 206, 251-252 (2000).
72. JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT 165-187 (Oxford Univ. Press 1999).
73. Cf. RAWLS, supra note 50, at 56-58.
74. For an exploration of the concept of constitutional culture, see Robert Post, Foreword - The Supreme Court 2002 Term: Fashioning the Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts and Law, 117 HARV. L. REV. 4, 107 (2003).
75. On the importance of processes of deliberation and justification in the context of commitments to constitutional democracy, see David Dyzenhaus, The Legitimacy of Legality, 46 U. TORONTO L.J. 129 (1996)
76. Frank I. Michelman, Foreword - The Supreme Court 1985 Term: Traces of Self-Government, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4, 34 (1986).
77. For the relevance of this understanding to South Africa in particular, see Etienne Mureinik, A Bridge to Where? Introducing the Interim Bill of Rights, 10 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 31 (1994).
78. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS (Bobbs-Merrill 1962).
79. WALDRON, supra note 52.
80. Cf. e.g., Grootboom, in Soobramoney v. Minister of Health, KwaZulu-Natal, 1997 (12) BCLR 1696 (CC) (S. Afr.). For a criticism of the Court's super-weak approach in this case,
81. see Scott & Alston, supra note 51.
82. Among defenders of legislative supremacy, Jeremy Waldron, in particular, acknowledges the possibility of such failures, but suggests that they are "non-core " rather than "core " arguments against legislative supremacy. See Jeremy Waldron, The Core Case Against Judicial Review, 115 YALE L.J. 1346 (2006).
83. See Guido Calabresi, Foreword - The Supreme Court 1990 Term: Antidiscrimination and Constitutional Accountability (What the Bork-Brennan Debate Ignores), 105 HARV. L. REV. 80, 104 (1991)
84. Dawn E. Johnsen, Presidential Non-Enforcement of Constitutionally Objectionable Statutes, 63 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 7, 34 (2000).
85. See Martha Minow, Foreword - The Supreme Court 1986 Term: Justice Engendered, 101 HARV. L. REV. 10 (1987).
86. See William N. Eskridge Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Foreword - The Supreme Court 1993 Term: Law as Equilibrium, 108 HARV. L. REV. 27, 88-91 (1994).
87. See Mark Graber, The Nonmajoritarian Difficulty: Legislative Deference to the Judiciary, 7 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 35, 40 (1993).
88. Marcia Klein, Development - SA Government Builds on Housing Promise BUSINESS TIMES (South Africa), July 6, 1997, at 3.
89. Sven Lunsche, ANC Good Deeds Come to Grief at Local Level, BUSINESS TIMES (South Africa), May 30, 1999, at 10.
90. Minister of Health and Others v. Treatment Action Campaign and Others, supra note 27, at para. 1.
91. For the potential link between this delay and coalition-driven burdens of inertia, see Alfreds & Jacobson, Long Walk to Save South African Lives, supra note 44, at 4;
92. Claire Bisseker, Aids, Medicine, Drugs, State President, FINANCIAL MAIL (South Africa), Sept. 22, 2000, at 35 (detailing substantial divisions within the ruling party in South Africa - the African National Congress (ANC) - over the likely benefits of the distribution of antiretrovirals).
93. On the relationship between socioeconomic rights guarantees and commitments to legitimate democratic ordering, see, for example, Frank I. Michelman, Welfare Rights in a Constitutional Democracy, 3 WASH. U.L.Q. 659 (19 79)
94. and Sunstein, supra note 3, at 124.
95. S. AFR. CONST. 1996, 3§6.
96. On the transformative nature of the 1993 and 1996 Constitutions, see Karl Klare, Legal Culture and Transformative Constitutionalism, 14 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 146 (1998).
97. See also CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DESIGNING DEMOCRACY: WHAT CONSTITUTIONS DO 67-69 (Oxford Univ. Press 2001).
98. Contra BICKEL, supra note 55.
99. For a definition of departmentalism, see, for example, Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say What the Law Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 217 (1994)
100. Mark Tushnet, Alternative Forms of Judicial Review, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2782 (2003)
101. Keith E. Whittington, Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation: Three Objections and Responses, 80 N.C.L. REV. 773, 783 (2002).
102. See FRANCESCA KLUG, VALUES FOR A GODLESS AGE: THE STORY OF THE UK'S NEW BILL OF RIGHTS (Penguin Books 2000). Conversational theories have also been advocated in the U.S.
103. See Robert W. Bennett, Counter-conversationalism and the Sense of Difficulty, 95 NW. U.L. REV. 845 (2001)
104. and, in Canada, Tsvi Kahana, Understanding the Notwithstanding Mechanism, 52 U. TORONTO L. J. 221 (2002).
105. Bennett, supra note 70, at 891.
106. For the idea of coercive, or "factical," and communicative power, See JÜRGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS (William Rehg trans., MIT Press 1996). Further, by "constitutional court," I simply mean a court with constitutional jurisdiction, rather than a specialized court of the kind common in civil law systems;
107. cf. Michel Rosenfeld, Constitutional Adjudication in Europe and the United States: Paradoxes and Contrasts, 2 INT'L J. CONST. L. (I·CON) 633 (2004). Specialized constitutional courts of the blatter kind often lack the power to resolve concrete individual disputes and thus have a more limited potential role in promoting dialogue.
108. For the concrete nature of this jurisdiction, and the scope of courts' remedial powers, see S. AFR. CONST. 1996, § 167-169, 172.
109. Cf. William N. Eskridge & John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 DUKE L.J. 1215, 1275 (2001)
110. Scott, supra note 11.
111. Cf. Minow, supra note 59, at 93-95;
112. Wesson, supra note 11, at 295.
113. Various courts in the Commonwealth have adopted interpretive techniques of "reading in" and "reading down," which allow them to either to add to the words used by the legislature or to give them a narrower construction than their ordinary meaning. In the South African context, see S. AFR. CONST. 1996, 1§72.
114. Cf., e.g., Roach, supra note 9, at 54.
115. While the link between judicial and media attention has been demonstrated most definitively in the U.S. context (see, e.g., Roy B. Flemming et al., Attention to Issues in a System of Separated Powers: The Macrodynamics of American Policy Agendas, 61 J. POL. 76, 84 (1999)) there is evidence in South Africa of a similar linkage. A search of two leading South African news publications that mentioned antiretroviral access in South Africa, showed that the number of news publications more than quadrupled in the year following the date on which the TAC decision was handed down (December 14, 2001), compared with the previous twelve months (i. e., to 17 from 4) (LEXIS).
116. Contrast, in this context, the prescriptions of other cooperative constitutional theories such as democratic minimalism. See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME 16-19, 24-27 (Harvard Univ. Press 1999).
117. See infra note 103.
118. Robert Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601, 1601 (1986). It maybe that such coercion is more indirect where positive rights are concerned, but judicial intervention in this context will often be a matter of life and death, or, at least, of substantial consequence to the ability of citizens to live a decent life, free from severe forms of state or market violence, which inevitably have judicial coercion (via enforcement of property laws) in the background.
119. From a dialogic perspective, this objection applies also to theories of judicial restraint. See BICKEL, supra note 55, at 69;
120. LARRY KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 102-103 (Oxford Univ. Press 2004).
121. Compare also DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION [FIN DE SIÈCLE] 236-264 (Harvard Univ. Press 1997)
122. and ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, DEMOCRACY REALIZED: THE PROGRESSIVE ALTERNATIVE (Verso 1998).
123. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION 4-8 (Harvard Univ. Press 1993).
124. In a dialogic understanding, legislative action in a modern, representative democracy is no more our action than it is that of the courts. See Michelman, supra note 54.
125. Contra James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129 (1893).
126. See, e.g., Christoper L. Eisgruber, Is the Supreme Court an Education Institution?, 67 N.YU. L. REV. 961 (1992)
127. Martha Minow, Interpreting Rights: An Essay for Robert Cover, 96 YALE L. J. 1860, 1903 (1987)
128. Max du Plessis, Between Apology and Utopia - The Constitutional Court and Public Opinion, 18 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 1, 28-29, 34 (2002).
129. See Roach, supra note 9, at 53, 56.
130. See, e.g., James Allan, The Author Doth Protest Too Much, Methinks: A Review of K. Roach, 'The Supreme Court on Trial: Judicial Activism or Democratic Dialogue', 20 N.Z.U.L.R. 519, 531 (2003).
131. Art. V imposes a state ratification requirement, which has no equivalent under 7§4(1) of the S. AFR. CONST. 1996. In addition, the effect of a two-thirds majority requirement is clearly more demanding in the United States than in South Africa, given the nature of partisan competition in the two systems.
132. See Tushnet, New Forms of Judicial Review, supra note 5, at 834.
133. Some scholars, such as Luc Tremblay, suggest that such an approach will not legitimately be open to courts, because the judicial deference it implies will not be compatible with notions of judicial responsibility and independence. Cf. Luc Tremblay, The Legitimacy of Judicial Review: The Limits of Dialogue Between Courts and Legislatures, 3 INT'L J. CONST. L. (I•CON) 617, 634-638 (2005).
134. In the understanding of dialogue advanced here, however, such deference will be entirely consistent with maintaining an independent judiciary and with the quasi-autonomous nature of judgemade constitutional law. This is because dialogue implies that a court should defer only to those legislative judgments it regards as sufficiently deliberative and representative of the broader constitutional culture. On the necessity of judicial deference in any truly dialogic conception of judicial review, see Jeremy Waldron, Some Models of Dialogue Between Judges and Legislators, 23 SUP. CT. L. REV. 7, 46 (2004).
135. See Rosalind Dixon, Designing Constitutional Dialogue: Bills of Rights and the New Commonwealth Constitutionalism (forthcoming 2008).
136. See also Peter W. Hogg & Allison A. Bushell, The Charter Dialogue Between Courts and Legislatures (Or Perhaps The Charter of Rights Isn't Such a Bad Thing After All), 35 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 75 (1997)
137. Christopher P. Manfredi & James B. Kelly, Six Degrees of Dialogue: A Response to Hogg and Bushell, 37 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 513 (1999)
138. KENT ROACH, THE SUPREME COURT ON TRIAL: JUDICIAL ACTIVISM OR DEMOCRATIC DIALOGUE (Irwin Law 2001).
139. See Roach, supra note 9, at 53, 56.
140. The distinction between the negative and positive dimension to these rights connotes the distinction between the state's duty to refrain from interference with individual's existing enjoyment of certain interests and the state's duty to take positive action to ensure the enjoyment of those interests: cf., e.g., Frank I. Michelman, The Constitution, Social Rights and Reason: A Tribute to Etienne Mureinik 14 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 499, 503-505 (1998)
141. De Vos, supra note 49, at 273-274. The distinction is one of degree only, of course, as the enjoyment of negative rights ultimately depends on background forms of government action, such as the establishment and enforcement of a system of private property law.
142. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 80, at 4-8.
143. Jaftha v. Schoeman & Others; Van Rooyen v. Stoltz & Others, 2005 (1) BCLR 78 (CC) (S. Afr.).
144. Unreported, Case No. 04/10330; 04/10331, Mar. 3, 2006.
145. Jaftha v. Schoeman & Others; and Van Rooyen v. Stoltz & Others 2005 (1) BCLR 78 (CC) at paras. 27-28 (S. Afr.)
146. City of Johannesburg v. Rand Properties Ltd. (Unreported, Case No. 04/10330; 04/10331, Mar. 3, 2006) at paras. 49, 51.
147. S. AFR. CONST. 1996, §169 (on the breadth of the jurisdiction of South African High Courts in this context).
148. Cf. Tushnet, Social Welfare Rights, supra note 5;
149. Mark S. Kende, The South African Constitutional Court's Embrace of Socioeconomic Rights: A Comparative Perspective, 6 CHAP. L. REV. 137, 152-155 (2003).
150. In contrast, where the positive dimension of first-generation rights claims is concerned, most judicial decisions are likely to take effect on a case-by-case basis and thus be more readily reversible by the legislature. See, e.g., the implementation of Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (upholding Sixth Amendment right to counsel for indigent defendants in noncapital cases),
151. as discussed in Stacey L. Reed, A Look Back at Gideon v. Wainwright After Forty Years: An Examination of the Illusory Sixth Amendment Right to Assistance of Counsel, 52 DRAKE L. REV. 47 (2003).
152. Yacoob J., who wrote the opinion of the Court in Grootboom, did have some experience in relation to housing matters. See http://www.constitutionalcourt.org.za/site/judges/justicezakYacoob/ index1.html (last visited Feb. 16, 2007). However, this experience was of a limited kind and did not involve access to the kind of budgetary information that would have been most helpful to the judge in this context.
153. See Bennett, supra note 70, at 891.
154. SUNSTEIN, supra note 80, at 11-14.
155. For the difference between dialogue and departmentalism in this context, see supra note 69 and accompanying text.
156. Cf. Tushnet, supra note 69, at 2782 (noting that moderate departmentalist accounts require the executive to comply with court decisions to which it is strictly a party).
157. SUNSTEIN, supra note 77, at 16-19.
158. Cf. section 3 supra.
159. See Mark Heywood, Contempt or Compliance? The TAC Case After the Constitutional Court Judgment, 4 ESR REV. 7 (2003).
160. See also Sandra Liebenberg, Needs, Rights and Transformation: Adjudicating Social Rights, 17 STELL. L. REV. 5, 31 (2006)
161. Tushnet, Social Welfare Rights, supra note 5, at 1914-1915.
162. Heywood, supra note 105, at 10.
163. The proceedings in Grootboom were brought by local legal representatives obtained by Grootboom and her co-plaintiffs; although the South African Legal Resources Centre intervened in support of her appeal before the Constitutional Court, it has not been involved in the ongoing monitoring or enforcement of the Grootboom judgment.
164. See Natasha Kim & Aaron Sawchuk, Searching for a New Rest under a Big Tree: A Case Study in the Grootboom Case and its Aftermath (unpublished paper, May 2005, copy on file with author).
165. Cf. order of SACC in August & Anor v. Electoral Commission & Others, 1999 (4) BCLR 363 (CC) (S. Afr.).
166. Wojciech Sadurski, Judicial Review and the Protection of Constitutional Rights, 22 Ox. J. LEG. STUD. 275 (2002).
167. Janet Hiebert, Parliament and the Human Rights Act: Can the JCHR Help Facilitate A Culture of Rights?, 4 INT'L J.CONST. L. (I•CON) 1 (2006).
168. Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational Adjudication, 112 YALE L. J. 273 (1997).
169. Kim Lane Scheppele, A Realpolitik Defense of Social Rights, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1921 (2004).
170. Government of the Republic of South Africa v. Grootboom, 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC) at para. 44 (S. Afr.)
171. Minister of Health and Others v. Treatment Action Campaign and Others 2002 (10) BCLR 1033 (CC) at para. 70 (S. Afr.).
172. Cf. GeoffBudlender, Socioeconomic Rights in the New Millennium: The Challenges of Implementation in SA. 1 ESR REV. (1999).
173. See Davis, supra note 4.
174. See supra note 64.
175. Ilse Fredericks, The Promise No-One Keeps, SUNDAY TIMES (South Africa), May 6, 2004, at 12.
176. For more recent progress in this area, see Sasha Planting, Housing: A Boost to Transform Informal Settlements, FINANCIAL MAIL (South Africa), Feb. 25, 2005, at 32.
177. See Dominic Mahlangu, A Place Where Promises Come to Die, SUNDAY TIMES (South Africa), July 11, 2004, at 13.
178. Id.
179. Heywood, supra note 105.
180. See, e.g., Bilchitz, Giving SER Teeth and Future SER Jurisprudence, supra note 5;
181. Roux, supra note 5.
182. CESCR, General Comment No 3, supra note 20, at para. 10.
183. On this conception of constitutional borrowing, see, for example. COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM: CASES AND MATERIALS 8 (Norman Dorsen et al. eds., Thomson/West 2003)
184. Mark Tushnet, The Possibilities of Comparative Constitutional Law, 108 YALE L.J. 1225, 1228-1235 (1999).
185. CESCR, General Comment No 3, supra note 20, at para. 10, and discussion in CORE OBLIGATIONS: BUILDING A FRAMEWORK FOR ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS (Audrey Chapman & Russell Sage eds., Intersentia 2002).
186. In the domestic context, this is because 3§9 of the S. AFR. CONST. 1996 requires the Constitutional Court to "consider," rather than directly give effect to, international law. (In any case, as a non-authoritative interpretation ofthe ICESCR, the concept of the minimum core is not entitled to absolute deference even under international law.)
187. Cf. Grootboom, 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC) at paras. 83-84 (S. Afr.).
188. Cf also Jaftha v. Schoeman and Others, 2005 (1) BCLR 78 (CC) at paras. 24-25 (S. Afr.).
189. Recall, that for some, the minimum core should simply be defined by reference to the requisites for survival in South Africa, See, e.g. Bilchitz, Giving SER Teeth and Future SER Jurisprudence, supra note 5.
190. I am indebted to Marius Pieterse for pressing me on this point.
191. The difficulties associated with amending the U.S. Constitution (cf. supra note 86), combined with the U.S. Supreme Court's insistence on a strong degree of judicial finality and exclusivity (see, e.g., Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997)), are generally viewed as giving the decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court an extremely strong degree of formal, if not necessarily practical, finality.