Amendment rules in constitutions

Public Choice

Volumn 115, Issue 1-2, 2003, Pages 37-61

  Giovannoni, Francesco ^a  

^a NEWCASTLE UNIVERSITY   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0037242175     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1022804712152     Document Type: Review

References (15)

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3. Cooter, R.D. (2000). The strategic constitution. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
4. Cuocolo, F. (2000). Istituzioni di diritto pubblico. Milano: Giuffrè.
5. Ferejohn, J. (1997). The politics of imperfection: The amendment of constitutions. Law and Social Inquiry 22: 501-531.
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7. Laffont, J.-J. (2000). Incentives and political economy. Clarendon Lectures in Economics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
8. Lutz, D.S. (1995). Toward a theory of constitutional amendment. In: S. Levinson (Ed.), Responding to imperfection: The theory and practice of constitutional amendment. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
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10. Maskin, E. and Tirole, J. (1999). Unforeseen contingencies and incomplete contracts. Review of Economic Studies 66: 83-114.
11. Mueller, D. (1999). On amending constitutions. Constitutional Political Economy 10: 385-396.
12. Persson, T., Poland, G. and Tabellini, G. (1997). Separations of powers and political accountability. Quarterly Journal of Economics 112: 1163-1202.
13. Romer, T. and Rosenthal, H. (1978). Political resource allocation, controlled agendas and the status quo. Public Choice 33: 27-43.
14. Voigt, S. (1997). Positive constitutional economics: A survey. Public Choice 90: 11-53.
15. Voigt, S. (1999). Implicit constitutional change - changing the meaning of the constitution without changing the text of the document. European Journal of Law and Economics 7: 197-224.