Rational Choice Requiem: The Decline of an Economic Paradigm and its Implications for Sociology

American Sociologist

Volumn 45, Issue 4, 2014, Pages 432-452

  Zafirovski, Milan ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF NORTH TEXAS   (United States)

Author keywords

Homo economicus; Institutional economics; Rational Choice Theory; Socio economics

Indexed keywords

EID: 84919952599     PISSN: 00031232     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s12108-014-9230-0     Document Type: Article

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