Are incentives without expertise sufficient? Evidence from fortune 500 firms

Strategic Management Journal

Volumn 36, Issue 1, 2015, Pages 113-122

  Feldman, Emilie R ^a   Montgomery, Cynthia A ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA   (United States)

^b HARVARD BUSINESS SCHOOL   (United States)

Author keywords

agency theory; capabilities; expertise; incentives; resource based view

Indexed keywords

AGENCY THEORY; CAPABILITIES; EXPERTISE; INCENTIVES; RESOURCE-BASED VIEW;

EID: 84918810498     PISSN: 01432095     EISSN: 10970266     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1002/smj.2211     Document Type: Review

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