The interactive turn in social cognition research: A critique

Philosophical Psychology

Volumn 28, Issue 2, 2015, Pages 160-183

  Overgaard, Søren ^a   Michael, John ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF COPENHAGEN   (Denmark)

Author keywords

Mindreading; Social Cognition; Social Interaction

Indexed keywords

EID: 84916235325     PISSN: 09515089     EISSN: 1465394X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/09515089.2013.827109     Document Type: Article

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