Theory-Theory and the Direct Perception of Mental States

Review of Philosophy and Psychology

Volumn 3, Issue 2, 2012, Pages 213-230

  Lavelle, Jane Suilin ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84873251674     PISSN: 18785158     EISSN: 18785166     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s13164-012-0094-3     Document Type: Article

References (43)

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