Impartial Institutions, Pathogen Stress and the Expanding Social Network

Human Nature

Volumn 25, Issue 4, 2014, Pages 567-579

  Hruschka, Daniel ^a   Efferson, Charles ^b   Jiang, Ting ^c   Falletta Cowden, Ashlan ^d   Sigurdsson, Sveinn ^e   McNamara, Rita ^f   Sands, Madeline ^a   Munira, Shirajum ^g   Slingerland, Edward ^f   Henrich, Joseph ^f  

^a ARIZONA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF ZURICH   (Switzerland)

^c UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA   (United States)

^d FIELD MUSEUM OF NATURAL HISTORY   (United States)

^e YALE NEW HAVEN HOSPITAL   (United States)

^f UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA   (Canada)

^g LAMB Project for Integrated Health and Development   (Bangladesh)

Author keywords

Cross cultural analysis; Insecurity; Institutions; Parasite; Parochialism; Pathogen

Indexed keywords

CULTURAL FACTOR; DEMOGRAPHY; GOVERNMENT; HUMAN; PHYSIOLOGICAL STRESS; SOCIAL NETWORK; SOCIAL SUPPORT;

CROSS-CULTURAL COMPARISON; GOVERNMENT; HUMANS; RESIDENCE CHARACTERISTICS; SOCIAL NETWORKING; SOCIAL SUPPORT; STRESS, PHYSIOLOGICAL;

EID: 84916220454     PISSN: 10456767     EISSN: 19364776     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s12110-014-9217-0     Document Type: Article

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