Persistent parochialism: Trust and exclusion in ethnic networks

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization

Volumn 55, Issue 1, 2004, Pages 1-23

  Bowles, Samuel ^a   Gintis, Herbert ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SIENA   (Italy)

^b Och Spine at New York Presbyterian Hospitals   (United States)

Author keywords

Exchange networks; Insider Outsider relationships; Parochialism

Indexed keywords

EID: 4444325421     PISSN: 01672681     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2003.06.005     Document Type: Article

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