On the Meaning of "Ought"

Oxford Studies in Metaethics

Volumn 7, Issue , 2012, Pages

  Chrisman, Matthew ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Expressivism; Inferentialism; Ought; Realism; Theoretical semantics

Indexed keywords

EID: 84911392509     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199653492.003.0010     Document Type: Chapter

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