Correction to: What ought probably means, and why you can’t detach it (Synthese, (2010), 177, 1, (67-89), 10.1007/s11229-009-9640-7);What ought probably means, and why you can't detach it

Synthese

Volumn 177, Issue 1, 2010, Pages 67-89

  Finlay, Stephen ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Deontic modals; Detaching problem; Instrumental principle; Normativity; Semantics of ought

Indexed keywords

EID: 77957908232     PISSN: 00397857     EISSN: 15730964     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11229-022-03605-1     Document Type: Erratum

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