The body social: An enactive approach to the self

Frontiers in Psychology

Volumn 5, Issue SEP, 2014, Pages

  Kyselo, Miriam ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF THE BASQUE COUNTRY UPV EHU   (Spain)

Author keywords

Body social problem; Distinction and participation; Embodied self; Enactive self; Social self

Indexed keywords

EID: 84907958832     PISSN: None     EISSN: 16641078     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00986     Document Type: Article

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