The enactive approach

The Routledge Handbook of Embodied Cognition

Volumn , Issue , 2014, Pages 68-78

  Di Paolo, Ezequiel ^a   Thompson, Evan ^b,c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF THE BASQUE COUNTRY UPV EHU   (Spain)

^b UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA   (Canada)

^c ROYAL SOCIETY OF CANADA   (Canada)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84955372817     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.4324/9781315775845     Document Type: Chapter

References (47)

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