A vital human need: Recognition as inclusion in personhood

European Journal of Political Theory

Volumn 8, Issue 1, 2009, Pages 31-45

  Ikäheimo, Heikki ^a  

^a MACQUARIE UNIVERSITY   (Australia)

Author keywords

Animals; Hegel; Honneth; Inclusion; Lifeworld; Norms; Persons; Recognition

Indexed keywords

EID: 57849150101     PISSN: 14748851     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/1474885108096958     Document Type: Article

References (31)

1. Charles Taylor (1992) 'The Politics of Recognition', in Amy Guttman (ed.) Multiculturalism and 'the Politics of Recognition', p. 26. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
2. Axel Honneth (1995) The Struggle for Recognition: The Zoral and Political Grammar of Social Conflicts. Cambridge: Polity Press (originally Kampf um Anerkennung. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp). On conceiving recognition in terms of attitudes, see also Heikki Ikäheimo and Arto Laitinen (2007) 'Analysing Recognition: Identification, Acknowledgement and Recognition between Persons', in Bert van den Brink and David Owen (eds) Recognition and Power, pp. 33-56. New York: Cambridge University Press.
3. On the social ontological aspect, see for instance Honneth's notes on social integration and its priority to system integration in 'The Point of Recognition: A Rejoinder to the Rejoinder', in Nancy Fraser and Axel Honneth (2003) Redistribution or Recognition? A Political-Philosophical Exchange, pp. 245-58. London: Verso as well as, Axel Honneth (1998) 'Democracy as Reflexive Cooperation: John Dewey and the Theory of Democracy Today', Political Theory 26(6): 763-83.
4. Honneth (n. 2), p. 172.
5. Even where Honneth criticizes Nancy Fraser for overdramatizing the importance of the psychological aspect of recognition in his theory (Honneth (2003, in n. 3), pp. 258-9) and emphasizes that of the social ontological aspect (ibid. pp. 245-58), the latter remains, as far as I can see, still subordinate to requirements of, as Honneth puts it, 'the most undamaged possible self-relation'. Honneth's latest book in fact represents a clear turn towards a more ontological approach to recognition: (2007) Reification: A New Look at an Old jdea. Oxford: Oxford University Press. But since it departs in several ways from his earlier programme and would therefore deserve a wholly separate discussion, I will ignore it here. Let me just say that whereas Honneth in Reification takes distance from his earlier Hegelian inspiration and conceptual apparatus, in this article I try to show that this is not necessary for an ontologically deep account of recognition.
6. See Christopher Zurn 'Anthropology and Normativity: A Critique of Axel Honneth's "Formal Conception of Ethical Life"', Philosophy and Social Criticism 26(1): 121. I believe that Honneth could answer this line of criticism by arguing that 'self-realization' is not just one ideal among others, but realizing any authentically chosen ideal. I cannot discuss this problem here.
7. Honneth (n. 2), p. 163.
8. Honneth is fully aware of aware of this problem: E.g. ibid. p. 164.
9. Having no space for full argumentative grounding, and having discussed most of the relevant details more fully elsewhere, I will present my interpretation of Hegel here mostly in the form of thesis. Heikki Ikäheimo (2004) 'On the Role of Intersubjectivity in Hegel's Encyclopaedic Phenomenology and Psychology', Bulletin of the Hegel Society of Great Britain 49/50: 73-95, contains a more thorough discussion of the function of recognition in the structures of intentionality distinguishing persons (or in Hegel's terms the 'concrete I' or 'concrete subject') from mere animals in Hegel. Ikäheimo and Laitinen (n. 2) contains a more thorough discussion of recognition conceived of in terms of attitudes. Heikki Ikäheimo (2007) 'Recognizing Persons' (in Heikki Ikäheimo and Arto Laitinen (eds), Dimensions of Personhood. Exeter: Imprint Academic) contains a more thorough discussion of personhood conceived of in terms of recognition. Elsewhere I have discussed in a more thorough and differentiated way Hegel's concept of spirit and its foundation in interpersonal recognition: Heikki Ikäheimo (2006) 'Rehabilitating Hegel's Spirit: Recognitive Attitude as a Social-Ontological Concept', paper read at the conference 'Social Ontology and Constitutive Attitudes' 29 Aug., University of Helsinki.
10. Robert Pippin (2000) 'What is the Question for which Hegel's Theory of Recognition is the Answer?', European Journal of Philosophy 8(2): 161.
11. G. W. F. Hegel (1975) Phenomenology of Spirit, tr. A. V. Miller, pp. 104-18. Oxford: Oxford University Press G. W. F. Hegel (1978-9) Philosophy of Subjective Spirit, ed. and tr. M. J. Petry, §§ 424-39. Boston, MA: D. Reidel Publishing Co. I should note that my primary references in the Hegelian corpus differ somewhat from Honneth's in that I read the famous self-consciousness-chapters of the 1807 Phenomenology of Spirit and the 1830 Encyclopaedia, whereas Honneth primarily refers in Honneth (n. 2) to the earlier texts of Hegel's Jena-period. I apply, somewhat unconventionally, Honneth's three-dimensional analysis of the concept of interpersonal recognition (although in a slightly modified form) to the reading of the self-consciousness chapters of the 1807 and the 1830 texts.
12. Robert Brandom (2007) 'The Structure of Desire and Recognition: Self-Consciousness and Self-Constitution', Philosophy and Social Criticism 33(1): 127-50. I do not use Brandom's notion of 'erotic significance' in exactly the same way that he does as regards to the inter-animal relation. Also, like Brandom, I am somewhat simplifying Hegel's complicated account of the transition from nature to spirit by not mentioning the sexual relation and reproduction, which for Hegel represent the point in nature closest to spirit. Finally, I am not interested in following Hegel's own way of using 'i, but intend my usage to resonate with a wide variety of classic and contemporary usages or intuitive meanings of the term.
13. Hegel talks sometimes of Herr und Sklav, sometimes of Herr und Knecht, which in understandable since the ideal development proceeds from the weaker being killed, to the weaker being enslaved (Sklav), through the weaker having to serve as a bondsman (Knecht), to a state of equal recognition.
14. Hegel (1975, in n. 11), p. 110.
15. See, for instance, Robert Brandom (1999) 'Some Pragmatist Themes in Hegel's Idealism: Negotiation and Administration in Hegel's Account of the Structure and Content of Conceptual Norms', European Journal of Philosophy 7(2): 164-89. Brandom is mainly interested in semantic norms, but his recognition-theoretical account can be easily generalized to social norms in general.
16. Here I am following Gregory Vlastos (1981) 'The Individual as an Object of Love in Plato', in his Platonic Studies, pp. 3-42. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. This primary sense of philia is not to be mixed with the more famous pleasure-philia, utility-philia and philia between the virtuous. Whereas these are different forms of concrete interpersonal relationships, philia in the primary sense ('pros hen legomenon') is a single attitude.
17. Harry Frankfurt (2004) Reasons of Love. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
18. These thoughts are influenced by discussions with Pirmin Stekeler-Weithofer. See also Honneth (1998, in n. 3), pp. 763-83.
19. As has often been pointed out, even war - to the extent that it is not simply pure annihilation - involves some mutually accepted norms and thus at least some cooperative structures.
20. I abstract here on purpose from considerations concerning third persons.
21. Axel Honneth (2000) 'Zwischen Aristoteles und Kant: Skizze einer Moral der Anerkennung', in Honneth, Das Andere der Gerechtigkeit, p. 187. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp.
22. This observation has broad-ranging implications which have to be suppressed here. Let me just say that in discussing e.g. expectations concerning the third form of recognition in sociology of work it would be, in my opinion, very important to distinguish this from instrumental valuing - i.e. if the concept of esteem is to have here any normative or emancipatory significance. Fighting for esteem is surely not fighting for instrumentalization.
23. This is not significantly affected by the fact that the lord is concerned for the well-being of the slave because this is instrumental to the ends of the master. Similarly Honneth's notion of 'solidarity' (closely connected to esteem), which, according to him, involves that we are 'concerned for the well-being of the other for the sake of our shared goals': Honneth (n. 21), p. 187. I am arguing that this cannot be merely instrumental concern if it is to be recognition.
24. There are of course good reasons why we may hope that others value us for our contributions instrumentally: Making oneself useful to others is the primary way to earn living in any society organized by division of labour. But not everything (and also not every attitude) that we may have reason to wish from others is (that of) interpersonal recognition.
25. See Fred R. Berger (1975) 'Gratitude', Ethics 85(4): 298-309. For similar thoughts about gratitude as a form of recognition, see also Paul Ricoeur (2005) The Course of Recognition, tr. David Pellauer, pp. 232-46. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. See also my (2008) 'Personhood and Social Inclusion of People with Disabilities: A Recognition-Theoretical Approach', in Kristjana Kristiansen, Tom Shakespeare and Simo Vehmas (eds) At the Crossroads of Disability Studies and Philosophical Ethics. New York: Routledge. In the last mentioned paper I argue that the third form of interpersonal recognition is what I call 'contributive valuing'; and (A's) gratitude to B is a positive emotion which is constituted by (1) A's belief that B contributes freely and out of (some) love to something A values, and (2) A's pro-attitude of contributive valuing towards B as a free and loving contributor.
26. Joshua Cohen (1997) 'The Arc of the Moral Universe', Philosophy and Public Affairs 26(2): 91-134, provides a broad view on the economic, social and moral aspects of slavery. As far as I can see, the 'essence' of slavery can be grasped as the lack (almost never complete) of interpersonal and institutional personhood of the slaves.
27. Saying anything about ideal institutional forms for the realization of the three dimensions of personhood is far beyond the aspirations of this article. Hegel's rational reconstruction of what he thought of as the ideal institutional structure of 'being-recognized' for his own time and culture is his Philosophy of Right.
28. This is saying that self-realization involves developing and using capacities for rational authority, for seeing the world in terms of values and for gratitude-worthy contribution, as well as becoming to have the corresponding person-making significances or statuses in the eyes of other persons. Within these - unambiguously ethical (sittlich) - parameters there is an unexhaustible space for individual, cultural, etc. variation.
29. In Ikäheimo (2007, in n. 9) I conceive of institutional personhood (under which juridical personhood falls) as a third layer of personhood in addition to the psychological and interpersonal layers of personhood.
30. See Michael Bach (2002): Social jnclusion as Solidarity - Rethinking the Child Rights Agenda. Perspectives on Social Inclusion Working Paper Series. Ontario: The Laidlaw Foundation (http://www.laidlawfdn.org/cms/ page1448.cfm, accessed 25 September 2007). On the relationship of recognition and rights, see also Jonathan Seglow's contribution to this issue. For a complementary view with mine on the importance of recognition for persons, see Arto Laitinen's contribution to this issue.
31. I am grateful to colleagues at the Conference on Philosophy and Social Sciences (Prague, 10-13 May 2007), as well as to Arto Laitinen, Cillian McBride and Jonathan Seglow for comments and questions on earlier versions of this article. Special thanks to Axel Honneth for a friendly discussion on the topics of this article.