Strategic entry and externalities in groundwater resources: Evidence from the lab

Resource and Energy Economics

Volumn 38, Issue , 2014, Pages 181-197

  Liu, Zhuo ^a   Suter, Jordan F ^b   Messer, Kent D ^a   Duke, Joshua M ^a   Michael, Holly A ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF DELAWARE   (United States)

^b Veterinary Dentistry and Oral Surgery   (United States)

Author keywords

C92; Common pool resources; Entry behavior; Experimental economics; Groundwater; H23; Q25; Spatial externalities

Indexed keywords

AQUIFERS; ECONOMICS; GROUNDWATER; HYDROGEOLOGY; WATER MANAGEMENT;

C92; COMMON POOL RESOURCES; ENTRY BEHAVIOR; EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS; H23; Q25; SPATIAL EXTERNALITIES;

GROUNDWATER RESOURCES; GROUNDWATER;

AQUIFER; DECISION MAKING; GROUNDWATER RESOURCE; HYDROGEOLOGY; WATER MANAGEMENT; COMMON PROPERTY RESOURCE; ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY; PUMPING; WATER USE;

EID: 84907304830     PISSN: 09287655     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.reseneeco.2014.07.002     Document Type: Article

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