Spatial externalities and the common-pool resource mechanism

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization

Volumn 70, Issue 1-2, 2009, Pages 402-415

  Schnier, Kurt Erik ^a  

^a GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Spatial CPRs; Spatial externalities

Indexed keywords

EID: 64249100154     PISSN: 01672681     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2009.02.004     Document Type: Article

References (21)

1. Budescu D., Rapoport A., and Suleiman R. Common pool resource dilemmas under uncertainty: qualitative tests of equilibrium solutions. Games and Economic Behavior 10 (1995) 171-201
2. Budescu D., Rapoport A., and Suleiman R. Positional order and group size effects in resource dilemmas with uncertain resources. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Making Processes 61 (1995) 225-238
3. Gordon H.S. The economic theory of a common-property resource: the fishery. Journal of Political Economy 62 (1954) 124-142
4. Hackett S., Schlager E., and Walker J. The role of communication in resolving commons dilemmas: experimental evidence with heterogeneous appropriators. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 27 (1994) 99-126
5. Hardin G. The tragedy of the commons. Science 162 (1968) 1243-1248
6. Hey, J.D., Neugebauer, T., Sadrieh, A., 2002. An experimental analysis of optimal renewable resource management: the fishery. Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research, Discussion Paper 37.
7. Keser C., and Gardner R. Strategic play of experienced subjects in a common pool resource game. International Journal of Game Theory 28 (1999) 241-252
8. Libecap G.D., and Wiggins S.N. Contractual responses to the common pool: prorationing of crude oil production. American Economic Review 74 (1984) 87-98
9. Mason C., and Philips O. Mitigating the tragedy of the commons through cooperation: an experimental evaluation. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 34 (1997) 148-172
10. Moxnes E. Not only the tragedy of the commons, misperception of bioeconomics. Management Science 44 (1998) 1234-1248
11. Moxnes E. Overexploitation of renewable resources: the role of misperception. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 37 (1998) 107-127
12. Ostrom E., Gardner R., and Walker J. Rules. Games and Common-Pool Resources (1994), University of Michigan Press, The Ann Arbor, MI
13. Ostrom E., Gardner R., and Walker J. Covenants with and without the sword: self-governance is possible. American Political Science Review 86 (1992) 404-417
14. Pulliam H.R. Sources, sinks and population regulation. American Naturalist 132 (1988) 652-661
15. Sanchirico J.N., and Wilen J.E. Optimal spatial management of renewable resources: matching policy scope to ecosystem scale. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 50 (2005) 23-46
16. Sanchirico J.N., and Wilen J.E. Bioeconomics of spatial exploitation in a patchy environment. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 37 (1999) 129-150
17. Schmitt P., Swope K., and Walker J. Collective action with incomplete commitment: Experimental evidence. Southern Economic Journal 66 (2000) 829-854
18. Schnier K.E., and Anderson C.M. Decision making in patchy resource environments: spatial misperception of bioeconomic models. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 61 (2006) 234-254
19. Walker J., and Gardner R. Probabilistic destruction of common-pool resources: experimental evidence. Economic Journal 120 (1992) 1149-1161
20. Walker J., Gardner R., Herr A., and Ostrom E. Collective choice in the commons: experimental results on proposed allocation rules and votes. Economic Journal 110 (2000) 212-234
21. Walker J., Gardner R., and Ostrom E. Rent dissipation in a limited-access common-pool resource: experimental evidence. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 19 (1990) 203-211