Testing for the cartel in OPEC: Non-cooperative collusion or just non-cooperative?

Oxford Review of Economic Policy

Volumn 27, Issue 1, 2011, Pages 144-168

  Almoguera, Pedro A ^a   Douglas, Christopher C ^b   Herrera, Ana María ^c  

^a US Government Accountability Office   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN FLINT   (United States)

^c WAYNE STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Cartel; Non cooperative behaviour; OPEC

Indexed keywords

COMPETITION (ECONOMICS); ECONOMIC ANALYSIS; EQUATION; ESTIMATION METHOD; OPEC; REGRESSION ANALYSIS;

EID: 80052223099     PISSN: 0266903X     EISSN: 14602121     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/oxrep/grr007     Document Type: Article

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