Cartel formation and oligopoly structure: A new assessment of the crude oil market

Applied Economics

Volumn 36, Issue 12, 2004, Pages 1355-1369

  Böckem, Sabine ^a  

^a TU DORTMUND UNIVERSITY   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

COMMODITY MARKET; CRUDE OIL; MARKET CONDITIONS; OLIGOPOLY; OPEC;

EID: 3543077640     PISSN: 00036846     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/0003684042000191093B     Document Type: Article

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