Delegation in the distributive policy arena: The case of research policy

Delegation in Contemporary Democracies

Volumn , Issue , 2006, Pages 146-170

  Braun, Dietmar ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF LAUSANNE   (Switzerland)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84906027533     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.4324/9780203306512     Document Type: Chapter

References (38)

1. Bernal, J. D. (1939) The Social Function of Science, London: Routledge.
2. Braun, D. (1993) 'Who Governs Intermediary Agencies? Principal-Agent Relations in Research Policy-Making', Journal of Public Policy, 13, (2): 135-162.
3. Braun, D. (1997) Die forschungspolitische Steuerung der Wissenschaft, Frankfurt am Main: Campus.
4. Braun, D. (1998) 'The Role of Funding Agencies in the Cognitive Development of Science', Research Policy, 27: 807-821.
5. Braun, D. (2003) 'Lasting Tensions in Research Policy-Making. A Delegation Problem', Science and Public Policy, 30, (5): 309-322.
6. Caswill, C. (1998) 'Social Science Policy. Challenges, Interactions, Principals and Agents', Science and Public Policy, 25, (5): 286-296.
7. Caswill, C. (2003) 'Principals, Agents, and Contracts', Science and Public Policy, 30, (5): 337-346.
8. Cohen, J. E. (1986) 'The Dynamics of the "Revolving Door" at the FCC', American Journal of Political Science, 30, (4): 689-708.
9. Coleman, J. S. (1990) Foundations of Social Theory, Cambridge MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
10. Elzinga, A. and Jamison, A. (1995) 'Changing Policy Agendas in Science and Technology', in S. Jasanoff et al. (eds) Handbook of Science, Technology, and Society, Beverly Hills CA: Sage.
11. Epstein, D. and O'Halloran, S. (1995) 'A Theory of Strategic Oversight. Congress, Lobbyists, and the Bureaucracy', Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 11: 227-255.
12. Epstein, D. and O'Halloran, S. (1999) Delegating Powers. A Transaction Cost Politics Approach to Policy Making under Separate Powers, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
13. Etzkowitz, H. and Leydesdorff, L. (1998) 'The Endless Transition. A Triple Helix of University-Industry-Government relations', Minerva, XXXVI: 203-218.
14. Etzkowitz, H. and Leydesdorff, L. (2000) 'The Dynamics of Innovation. From National Systems and "Mode 2" to a Triple Helix of University-Industry-Government Relations', Research Policy, 29: 109-123.
15. Fiorina, M. P. (1981) 'Congressional Control of the Bureaucracy: A Mismatch of Incentives and Capabilities', in L. C. Dodd and B. Oppenheimer (eds) Congress Reconsidered, 2nd edn, Washington DC: Congressional Quarterly Press.
16. Gilardi, F. (2002) 'Policy Credibility and Delegation to Independent Regulatory Agencies. A Comparative Empirical Analysis', Journal of European Public Policy, 9, (6): 873-893.
17. Gilardi, F. (2004) 'Delegation in the Regulatory State. Origins and Diffusion of Independent Regulatory Agencies in Western Europe', PhD dissertation, Université de Lausanne.
18. Godin, B. (2001) 'Defining R&D. Is Research Always Systematic?' Project on the History and Sociology of S&T Statistics, Paper No. 7, University of Montréal; http://www.inrs-urb.uquebec.ca.
19. Gormley, W. T. (1979) 'A Test of the Revolving Door Hypothesis at the FCC', American Journal of Political Science, 23, (4): 665-683.
20. Guston, D. H. (1996) 'Principal-Agent Theory and the Structure of Science Policy', Science and Public Policy, 23, (4): 229-240.
21. Guston, D. H. (2000) Between Politics and Science. The Integrity and Productivity of Research, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
22. Guston, D. H. (2001) 'Boundary Organizations in Environmental Policy and Science. An Introduction', Science, Technology, and Human Values, 26, (4): 399-408.
23. Guston, D. and Keniston, K. (eds) (1994) The Fragile Contract. University Science and the Federal Government, Cambridge MA: MIT Press.
24. Heclo, H. (1978) 'Issue Networks and the Executive Establishment', in A. King (ed.) The New American Political System, Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute.
25. Irvine, J. and Martin, B. R. (1984) Foresight in Science. Picking the Winners, London:Pinter.
26. Lowi, T. J. (1972) 'Four Systems of Policy, Politics, and Choice', Public Administration Review, July/August: 298-310.
27. Majone, G. (2001a) 'Two Logics of Delegation. Agency and Fiduciary Relations in EU Governance', European Union Politics, 2 (1): 103-121.
28. Majone, G. (2001b) 'Nonmajoritarian Institutions and the Limits of Democratic Governance. A Political Transaction-Cost Approach', Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 157: 57-78.
29. McCubbins, M. D. (1985) 'The Legislative Design of Regulatory Structure', American Journal of Political Science, 29: 721-748.
30. McCubbins, M. D. and Schwartz, T. (1984) 'Congressional Oversight Overlooked. Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms', American Journal of Political Science, 28, (1): 165-179.
31. Meulen, B. J. R. (1998) 'Science Policies as Principal-Agent Games. Institutionalization and Path-Dependency in the Relation between Government and Science', Research Policy, 27: 397-414.
32. Morris, N. (2003) 'Academic Researchers as "Agents" of Science Policy', Science and Public Policy, 30, (5): 359-370.
33. Olson, M. (1982) The Rise and Decline of Nations. Economic Growth, Stagflation, and Social Rigidities, New Haven CT and London: Yale University Press.
34. Price, D. K. (1954) Government and Science. Their Dynamic Relation in American Democracy, New York: New York University Press.
35. Stokes, D. E. (1997) Pasteur's Quadrant. Basic Science and Technological Innovation, Washington DC: Brookings Institution.
36. Thatcher, M. and Stone Sweet, A. (2002) 'Theory and Practice of Delegation to Non-majoritarian Institutions', West European Politics, 25, (1): 125-147.
37. Tsebelis, G. (2002) Veto Players. How Political Institutions Work, Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press.
38. Weingast, B. R. (1984) 'The Congressional-Bureaucratic System. A Principal-Agent Perspective (With Application to the SEC)', Public Choice, 44: 147-191.