Quality of primary care in low-income countries: Facts and economics

Annual Review of Economics

Volumn 6, Issue , 2014, Pages 525-553

  Das, Jishnu ^a,b   Hammer, Jeffrey ^c  

^a WORLD BANK   (United States)

^b CENTRE FOR POLICY RESEARCH   (India)

^c PRINCETON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

audit studies; credence goods; health markets; public and private care

Indexed keywords

EID: 84905679721     PISSN: 19411383     EISSN: 19411391     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1146/annurev-economics-080213-041350     Document Type: Article

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