The bureaucratization of safety

Safety Science

Volumn 70, Issue , 2014, Pages 348-357

  Dekker, Sidney W A ^a,b  

^a GRIFFITH UNIVERSITY   (Australia)

^b UNIVERSITY OF QUEENSLAND   (Australia)

Author keywords

Bureaucratic accountability; Ethics; Modernism; Responsibility; Safety; Vision zero

Indexed keywords

ACCIDENT PREVENTION; SAFETY TESTING;

BUREAUCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY; ETHICS; MODERNISM; RESPONSIBILITY; VISION ZERO;

RENEWABLE ENERGY RESOURCES; ACCIDENT PREVENTION;

ARTICLE; BUREAUCRATIZATION; BUSINESS ETHICS; COMMERCIAL PHENOMENA; INSURANCE; PREDICTION; PRIORITY JOURNAL; QUALITY CONTROL; RESPONSIBILITY; RISK ASSESSMENT; RISK BENEFIT ANALYSIS; RISK REDUCTION; STANDARDIZATION; COMPENSATION; HARM REDUCTION; HEALTH INSURANCE; LABOR; LEGAL LIABILITY; OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY; ORGANIZATION; SOCIAL DOMINANCE; SPECIALIZATION; TASK PERFORMANCE;

EID: 84905242488     PISSN: 09257535     EISSN: 18791042     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.ssci.2014.07.015     Document Type: Article

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