I want to believe: Some myths about the management of industrial safety

Cognition, Technology and Work

Volumn 16, Issue 1, 2014, Pages 13-23

  Besnard, Denis ^a   Hollnagel, Erik ^a  

^a PSL RESEARCH UNIVERSITY   (France)

Author keywords

Accident investigation; Human error; Industrial safety; Procedure compliance; Protection and safety; Root causes; Safety first; Safety management

Indexed keywords

ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION; HUMAN ERRORS; PROCEDURE COMPLIANCE; ROOT CAUSE; SAFETY FIRSTS; SAFETY MANAGEMENT;

ACCIDENTS; ERRORS; INDUSTRY; RISK MANAGEMENT;

ACCIDENT PREVENTION;

EID: 84893649151     PISSN: 14355558     EISSN: 14355566     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10111-012-0237-4     Document Type: Article

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