Targeting autocrats: Economic sanctions and regime change

European Journal of Political Economy

Volumn 36, Issue , 2014, Pages 24-40

  Oechslin, Manuel ^a  

^a TILBURG UNIVERSITY   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

Democratization; Economic sanctions; Exile; F51; O11; O19; Public goods; Regime change

Indexed keywords

EID: 84904914179     PISSN: 01762680     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2014.07.003     Document Type: Article

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