Culture-dependent strategies in coordination games

Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America

Volumn 111, Issue SUPPL.3, 2014, Pages 10889-10896

  Jackson, Matthew O ^a,b,c   Xing, Yiqing ^a  

^a STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b SANTA FE INSTITUTE   (United States)

^c CANADIAN INSTITUTE FOR ADVANCED RESEARCH   (Canada)

Author keywords

Convention; Focal point; Homophily; Inequality; Social networks

Indexed keywords

ADULT; AGED; ARTICLE; COORDINATION; CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY; GAME; HUMAN; HUMAN EXPERIMENT; INDIA; PRIORITY JOURNAL; RELIGION; SOCIAL NETWORK; UNITED STATES;

CONVENTION; FOCAL POINT; HOMOPHILY; INEQUALITY; SOCIAL NETWORKS;

ADOLESCENT; ADULT; AGED; AGED, 80 AND OVER; CROSS-CULTURAL COMPARISON; CULTURE; FEMALE; GAME THEORY; GAMES, EXPERIMENTAL; HUMANS; INDIA; MALE; MIDDLE AGED; SOCIAL BEHAVIOR; UNITED STATES; YOUNG ADULT;

EID: 84904615200     PISSN: 00278424     EISSN: 10916490     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1073/pnas.1400826111     Document Type: Article

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