Impacts of pay for performance on the quality of primary care

Risk Management and Healthcare Policy

Volumn 7, Issue , 2014, Pages 113-120

  Allen, Thomas ^a   Mason, T ^a   Whittaker, W ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MANCHESTER   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Financial incentives; Pay for performance; Primary care; Quality of health care

Indexed keywords

CASE STUDY; CLINICAL EFFECTIVENESS; CLINICAL EVALUATION; HEALTH CARE COST; HEALTH CARE DISPARITY; HEALTH CARE QUALITY; HEALTH SERVICE; HUMAN; INCOME; MEDICAL PRACTICE; OUTCOME ASSESSMENT; PAY FOR PERFORMANCE; PRIMARY MEDICAL CARE; REVIEW; TOTAL QUALITY MANAGEMENT;

EID: 84904010390     PISSN: None     EISSN: 11791594     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2147/RMHP.S46423     Document Type: Review

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