Pirates, prisoners, and preliterates: Anarchic context and the private enforcement of law

European Journal of Law and Economics

Volumn 37, Issue 3, 2014, Pages 365-379

  Leeson, Peter T ^a  

^a GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Anarchy; Discipline of continuous dealings; Pirates; Preliterate societies; Prison gangs; Self governance

Indexed keywords

EID: 84901046262     PISSN: 09291261     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10657-013-9424-x     Document Type: Article

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