Early warnings, weak signals and learning from healthcare disasters

BMJ Quality and Safety

Volumn 23, Issue 6, 2014, Pages 440-445

  Macrae, Carl ^a  

^a IMPERIAL COLLEGE LONDON   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

DISASTER MEDICINE; DISASTER PLANNING; HEALTH CARE ORGANIZATION; HEALTH CARE QUALITY; HUMAN; KNOWLEDGE; LEARNING; PATIENT SAFETY; REVIEW;

EID: 84901006673     PISSN: 20445415     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1136/bmjqs-2013-002685     Document Type: Review

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