Physician payment mechanisms, hospital length of stay and risk of readmission: Evidence from a natural experiment

Journal of Health Economics

Volumn 36, Issue 1, 2014, Pages 112-124

  Échevin, Damien ^a   Fortin, Bernard ^b  

^a UNIVERSITÉ DE SHERBROOKE   (Canada)

^b UNIVERSITÉ LAVAL   (Canada)

Author keywords

Duration model; Hospital length of stay; Mixed compensation; Natural experiment; Physician payment mechanisms; Risk of re hospitalisation

Indexed keywords

COMPENSATION SYSTEM; EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS; HEALTH SERVICES; HOSPITAL SECTOR; INCENTIVE; REFORM PROCESS;

ARTICLE; CANADA; COMPENSATION; CONTROLLED STUDY; DECISION MAKING; GOVERNMENT; HEALTH SERVICE; HOSPITAL PHYSICIAN; HOSPITAL READMISSION; HUMAN; LENGTH OF STAY; MEDICAL FEE; MEDICAL SPECIALIST; PHYSICIAN PAYMENT MECHANISM; RISK ASSESSMENT; THEORETICAL MODEL; ADULT; DIAGNOSIS RELATED GROUP; ECONOMICS; FEMALE; MALE; MIDDLE AGED; NORMAL DISTRIBUTION; REIMBURSEMENT; STATISTICAL MODEL; STATISTICS AND NUMERICAL DATA;

CANADA; QUEBEC [CANADA];

ADULT; DIAGNOSIS-RELATED GROUPS; FEMALE; HUMANS; LENGTH OF STAY; MALE; MIDDLE AGED; MODELS, ECONOMETRIC; NORMAL DISTRIBUTION; PATIENT READMISSION; QUEBEC; REIMBURSEMENT MECHANISMS;

EID: 84900000305     PISSN: 01676296     EISSN: 18791646     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jhealeco.2014.03.008     Document Type: Article

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