Thirty years of shareholder rights and firm value

Journal of Finance

Volumn 69, Issue 3, 2014, Pages 1167-1196

  Cremers, Martijn ^a   Ferrell, Allen ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF NOTRE DAME   (United States)

^b HARVARD LAW SCHOOL   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84899983448     PISSN: 00221082     EISSN: 15406261     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12138     Document Type: Article

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