Budget feasible mechanisms for experimental design

Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)

Volumn 8392 LNCS, Issue , 2014, Pages 719-730

  Horel, Thibaut ^a   Ioannidis, Stratis ^b   Muthukrishnan, S ^c  

^a ECOLE NORMALE SUPÉRIEURE   (France)

^b Technicolor ^*  (France)

^c RUTGERS UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

INFORMATION SCIENCE; POLYNOMIAL APPROXIMATION; STATISTICS;

DETERMINISTIC MECHANISM; EXPONENTIAL TIME; LEARNING PROBLEM; POLYNOMIAL-TIME; POLYNOMIAL-TIME MECHANISM; SUBMODULAR;

BUDGET CONTROL;

EID: 84899921103     PISSN: 03029743     EISSN: 16113349     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-54423-1_62     Document Type: Conference Paper

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