The price of democracy in coalition formation

Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS

Volumn 1, Issue , 2009, Pages 252-259

  Chalkiadakis, Georgios ^a   Elkind, Edith ^a,b   Polukarov, Maria ^a   Jennings, Nicholas R ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHAMPTON   (United Kingdom)

^b NANYANG TECHNOLOGICAL UNIVERSITY   (Singapore)

Author keywords

Coalition formation; Game theory; Multilateral bargaining

Indexed keywords

AUTONOMOUS AGENTS; ECONOMICS; GAME THEORY;

COALITION FORMATIONS; COALITIONAL GAME; DISTRIBUTED ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE; EFFICIENT COMPUTATION; LOSS OF EFFICIENCIES; MULTILATERAL BARGAINING; NON-COOPERATIVE; WEIGHTED VOTING GAMES;

MULTI AGENT SYSTEMS;

EID: 84899809606     PISSN: 15488403     EISSN: 15582914     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

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