Mergers and collusion in all-pay auctions and crowdsourcing contests

12th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems 2013, AAMAS 2013

Volumn 1, Issue , 2013, Pages 675-682

  Lev, Omer ^a   Polukarov, Maria ^b   Bachrach, Yoram ^c   Rosenschein, Jeffrey S ^a  

^a HEBREW UNIVERSITY OF JERUSALEM   (Israel)

^b UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHAMPTON   (United Kingdom)

^c MICROSOFT RESEARCH   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

All Pay Auction; Collusion; Crowdsourcing; Mergers

Indexed keywords

AUTONOMOUS AGENTS; COMMERCE; MULTI AGENT SYSTEMS; PROFITABILITY;

ALL-PAY AUCTION; COLLUDERS; COLLUSION; CROWDSOURCING; EXPECTED UTILITY; MERGERS; SOCIAL WELFARE; WINNING BIDS;

MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS;

EID: 84899452169     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

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