Crony capitalism: Rent seeking, institutions and ideology

Kyklos

Volumn 67, Issue 2, 2014, Pages 156-176

  Aligica, Paul Dragos ^a   Tarko, Vlad ^a  

^a GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

CAPITALISM; DEVELOPING WORLD; ECONOMIC THEORY; IDEOLOGY; INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK; MICROECONOMICS; RENT SEEKING;

EID: 84898015937     PISSN: 00235962     EISSN: 14676435     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/kykl.12048     Document Type: Article

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