Will there be a neurolaw revolution?

Indiana Law Journal

Volumn 89, Issue 2, 2014, Pages 807-845

  Kolber, Adam J ^a  

^a Department of Law   (France)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84897820704     PISSN: 00196665     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (123)

1. Joshua Greene & Jonathan Cohen, For the Law, Neuroscience Changes Nothing and Everything, 359 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC'Y LONDON B 1775, 1776 (2004).
2. Stephen J. Morse, Brain Overclaim Syndrome and Criminal Responsibility: A Diagnostic Note, 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 397, 402 (2006) ("Many thorough-going naturalists, such as myself, who believe that all the phenomena of the universe are causally explicable by natural physical laws, believe that responsibility is compatible with determinism, a position termed 'compatibilism.'").
3. See Stephen J. Morse, Neuroscience and the Future of Personhood and Responsibility, in CONSTITUTION 3.0: FREEDOM AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 113, 122 (Jeffrey Rosen & Benjamin Wittes eds., 2011).
4. Cf. JOHN MARTIN FISCHER, ROBERT KANE, DERK PEREBOOM & MANUAL VARGAS, FOUR VIEWS ON FREE WILL 2 (2007) ("Something is deterministic if it has only one physically possible outcome.")
5. Gary Watson, Introduction to FREE WILL 1, 2 (Gary Watson ed., 1982).
6. GALEN STRAWSON, FREEDOM AND BELIEF 4 (rev. ed., 2010) (describing the "stronger" notion of determinism).
7. See, e.g., HARRY G. FRANKFURT, Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person, in THE IMPORTANCE OF WHAT WE CARE ABOUT 11, 19-25 (1988) (claiming that even mechanistic actions can be freely willed if an individual is capable of developing second-order desires about his first-order desires).
8. See, e.g., Michael S. Pardo & Dennis Patterson, Neuroscience, Normativity, and Retributivism, in THE FUTURE OF PUNISHMENT 133, 134-35 (Thomas Nadelhoffer ed., 2013)
9. O. Carter Snead, Neuroimaging and the "Complexity" of Capital Punishment, 82 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1265, 1299-338 (2007).
10. See ROBERT WRIGHT, THE MORAL ANIMAL: EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY AND EVERYDAY LIFE 351-56 (1994).
11. See, e.g., John Horgan, The Forgotten Era of Brain Chips, SCI. AM., Oct. 1, 2005, at 66, 67-68.
12. John A. Osmundsen, 'Matador' With a Radio Stops Wired Bull, N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 1965, at A1.
13. See Benjamin Libet, Curtis A. Gleason, Elwood W. Wright & Dennis K. Pearl, Time of Conscious Intention to Act in Relation to Onset of Cerebral Activity (Readiness-Potential): The Unconscious Initiation of a Freely Voluntary Act, 106 BRAIN 623 (1983)
14. DANŒL M. WEGNER, THE ILLUSION OF CONSCIOUS WILL 50-55 (2002).
15. For doubts about the standard interpretation of Libet's experiments, see, for example, Aaron Schurger, Jacobo D. Sitt & Stanislas Dehaene, An Accumulator Model for Spontaneous Neural Activity Prior to Self-Initiated Movement, 109 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. SCI. U.S. AM., at E2904 (2012).
16. Cf. Neil Levy, Libet's Impossible Demand, 12 J. CONSCIOUSNESS STUD. 67, 68 (2005) ("We do not need experimental results to show that we do not exercise the kind of control that seems to be at issue in the debate over Libet's experiments.").
17. James Q. Whitman, A Plea Against Retributivism, 7 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 85, 85 (2003) ("[T]he United States has embarked on a campaign of intensifying harshness in criminal punishment over the last three decades or so.").
18. Chris Kaposy, Will Neuroscientific Discoveries About Free Will and Selfhood Change our Ethical Practices?, 2 NEUROETHICS 51, 53-54 (2009).
19. Stephen Morse correctly notes that consequentialist policies are not entailed by the belief that mechanism and responsibility are inconsistent. Stephen J. Morse, Avoiding Irrational Neuro Law Exuberance: A Plea for Neuromodesty, 62 MERCER L. REV. 837, 856 (2011). And even if they were, as a predictive matter, people may or may not adopt conclusions that are entailed by their other beliefs.
20. See, e.g., David Eagleman, The Brain on Trial, ATLANTIC, July-Aug. 2011, at 112, 115 ("Discoveries in neuroscience suggest a new way forward for law and order - one that will lead to a more cost-effective, humane, and flexible system than the one we have today.")
21. Gareth Cook, Neuroscience Challenges Old Ideas About Free Will, SCI. AM., (Nov. 15, 2011), http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=free-will- and-the-brain-michael-gazzaniga-interview (quoting neuroscientist Michael Gazzaniga saying "I think we will get over the idea of free will").
22. For example, the Supreme Court has cited neuroscience evidence about the impulsivity and risk preferences of juveniles in order to make inferences about juvenile culpability, even though the neuroscience evidence tells us little about culpability that we did not already know from psychological research and our own life experiences. See, e.g., Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2465 n. 5 (2012) (favorably citing extensive neuroscience evidence presented in amicus briefs)
23. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2026 (2010) ("[D]evelopments in psychology and brain science continue to show fundamental differences between juvenile and adult minds. For example, parts of the brain involved in behavior control continue to mature through late adolescence.").
24. Kathleen D. Vohs & Jonathan W. Schooler, The Value of Believing in Free Will: Encouraging a Belief in Determinism Increases Cheating, 19 PSYCHOL. SCI. 49 (2008).
25. Roy F. Baumeister, E.J. Masicampo & C. Nathan De Wall, Prosocial Benefits of Feeling Free: Disbelief in Free Will Increases Aggression and Reduces Helpfulness, 35 PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. BULL. 260 (2009).
26. E.P. EVANS, THE CRIMINAL PROSECUTION and CAPITAL PUNISHMENT OF ANIMALS (1906).
27. DOROTHY L. CHENEY & ROBERT M. SEYFARTH, HOW MONKEYS SEE THE WORLD: INSIDE THE MIND OF ANOTHER SPECIES 1 (1990).
28. Paul Schiff Berman, Rats, Pigs, and Statues on Trial: The Creation of Cultural Narratives in the Prosecution of Animals and Inanimate Objects, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 288, 290 (1994).
29. Even today, there are modern day equivalents of animal trials. Consider how Yellowstone National Park rangers decide which grizzly bears to euthanize: In the mid-1980s, a group of federal and state wildlife biologists called the Interagency Grizzly Bear Committee put out a set of formal guidelines - sort of like a penal code for wild animals. The rules are quite elaborate but essentially they state: If a grizzly hurts someone while acting in a naturally aggressive way, then the bear goes free. If a grizzly acts unnaturally aggressive, though, and injures a person, it must be euthanized. It all comes down to the animal's state of mind. Jessica Grose, A Death in Yellowstone: On the Trail of a Killer Grizzly Bear, SLATE (Apr. 2, 2012, 6:00 AM), http://www.slate.com/articIes/health-and-science/death-in-yellowstone/2012/04/ grizzly-bear-attacks-how-wildlife-investigators-found-a-killer-grizzly-in- yellowstone-single.html.
30. Morse, supra note 5, at 120; see also Emad H. Atiq, How Folk Beliefs About Free Will Influence Sentencing: A New Target for the Neuro-Determinist Critics of Criminal Law, 16 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 449, 463 (2013) (stating that legal scholars like Stephen Morse "observe that the legal concept of 'free will' is... compatibilisf' and "persuasively argue that substantive legal doctrine does not rely on a metaphysically suspect notion of free will" (emphasis in original)).
31. Stephen J. Morse, The Non-Problem of Free Will in Forensic Psychiatry and Psychology, 25 BEHAV. Sci. & LAW 203, 203 (2007) [hereinafter Morse, Non-Problem].
32. See, e.g., Stephen J. Morse, Compatibilist Criminal Law, in THE FUTURE OF PUNISHMENT, supra note 18, at 107.
33. The pertinent statements were also endorsed by the Minnesota Supreme Court. See State v. Hoyt, 13 Minn. 132, 145 (1868)
34. see also Eanes v. State, 10 Tex. Ct. App. 421, 447 (1881).
35. See David Rose & Shaun Nichols, The Lesson of Bypassing, 4 REV. PHIL. & PSYCHOL. 599, 600 (2013) (arguing that incompatibilist intuitions "run[] even deeper than previously recognized").
36. There is still much dispute, however, over the nature of lay intuitions about free will. Compare Shaun Nichols & Joshua Knobe, Moral Responsibility and Determinism: The Cognitive Science of Folk Intuitions, 41 NOUS 663 (2007),
37. Eddy Nahmias, Stephen Morris, Thomas Nadelhoffer & Jason Turner, Surveying Freedom: Folk Intuitions about Free Will and Moral Responsibility, 18 PHIL. PSYCHOL. 561 (2005)
38. Adina L. Roskies & Shaun Nichols, Bringing Moral Responsibility Down to Earth, 105 J. PHIL. 371, 376-78, 388 (2008) (attempting to explain the conflicting results).
39. SANFORD H. KADISH, STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, CAROL S. STEIKER & RACHEL E. BARKOW, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES 591 (9th ed. 2012).
40. Gideon Yaffe has argued that John Locke's late-1600s commentary about the nature of volition was highly influential in the development of Britain's voluntary act requirement that we subsequently imported to the United States. Gideon Yaffe, Libet and the Criminal Law's Voluntary Act Requirement, in CONSCIOUS WILL AND RESPONSIBILITY: A TRIBUTE TO BENJAMIN LIBET 189, 194-97 (Walter Sinnott-Armstrong & Lynn Nadel eck, 2011). Emad Atiq suggests that because Locke was a compatibilist who influenced the law's voluntary act requirement, we have reason to think that the criminal law has imported Locke's compatibilism. Atiq, supra note 61, at 463-64. This analysis, however, is too hasty. First, it is hardly obvious that an unelected commentator's discussion of a legally relevant issue, even if it is influential, is fundamental to our legal interpretation of doctrine related to that issue. The Michigan Supreme Court's contrary view in Maher, for example, would seem more legally relevant. Second, even if Locke's views about volition influenced the voluntary act requirement, Atiq has not demonstrated that Locke's compatibilism influenced the judges and lawmakers who crafted the voluntary act requirement. And finally, if the deep tradition of criminal law is rooted in libertarian notions of freedom, as seems likely, then it is hardly clear how any one commentator's view about one particular doctrine could transform the fundamental nature of the entirety of criminal law.
41. See Lockert v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (stating that sentencers should ordinarily "not be precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant's character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death") (emphasis in original)
42. see also Deborah W. Dermo, Courts' Increasing Consideration of Behavioral Genetics Evidence in Criminal Cases: Results of a Longitudinal Study, 2011 MICH. ST. L. REV. 967, 974 ("Overall, courts today appear far less skeptical about accepting behavioral genetics evidence, and they do so in the majority of cases in which defense attorneys attempt to offer it.").
43. Stephen J. Morse, Determinism and the Death of Folk Psychology: Two Challenges to Responsibility from Neuroscience, 9 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 1, 4 n. 5 (2008).
44. See generally Anthony R. Benedetto, Not Just "X-Rays" Today: Recommendations for Admissibility of Modern Radiology Images, 49 S. TEX. L. REV. 113, 126-78 (2007) (describing the history of court room admission of diagnostic images beginning with radiographs in 1896).
45. *9 (D. Neb. June 26, 2006)
46. Middleton v. State, 2007-KA-01023-COA (⊥⊥ 13-32) (Miss. Ct. App. 2008)
47. *2 (Wash. Ct. App. Apr. 17, 2007)
48. see also Am. Acad, of Pediatrics, Diagnostic Imaging of Child Abuse, 105 PEDIATRICS 1345, 1346-47 (2000).
49. Id. at 837 (quoting The Ethics of Brain Science: Open Your Mind, ECONOMIST, May 25, 2002, at 93, available at http://www.economist.com/node/ 1143317/print).
50. RAY KURZWEIL, THE SINGULARITY IS NEAR: WHEN HUMANS TRANSCEND BIOLOGY 73 (2005) ("The cost of DNA sequencing came down from about ten dollars per base pair in 1990 to a couple of pennies in 2004 and is rapidly continuing to fall...").
51. John Markoff, Breaking a Gene Barrier, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 2012, at B1.
52. See Jacob O. Kitzman, Matthew W. Snyder, Mario Venura, Alexandra P. Lewis, Ruolan Qiu, La Vone E. Simmons, Hilary S. Gammill, Craig E. Rubens, Donna A. Santillan, Jeffrey C. Murray, Holly K. Tabor, Michael J. Bamshad, Evan E. Eichler & Jay Shendure, Non-Invasive Whole Genome Sequencing of a Human Fetus, 4 SCI. TRANSLATIONAL MED. 137 (2012)
53. Andrew Pollack, Tests of Parents Are Used to Map Genes of a Fetus, N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 2012, at A1
54. see also H. Christina Fan, Wei Gu, Jianbin Wang, Yair J. Blumenfeld, Yasser Y. El-Sayed & Stephen R. Quake, Non-Invasive Prenatal Measurement of the Fetal Genome, 487 NATURE 320 (2012).
55. Gina Kolata, In Leukemia Treatment, Glimpses of the Future, N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 2012, at 1N.
56. See, e.g., Nikolaus Kriegeskorte, W. Kyle Simmons, Patrick S.F. Bellgowan & Chris I. Baker, Circular Analysis in Systems Neuroscience: The Dangers of Double Dipping, 12 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 535, 535 (2009) (arguing that many neuroscience studies engage in inappropriate "double dipping" by using the "same data for selection and selective analysis")
57. Sander Nieuwenhuis, Birte U. Forstmann & Eric-Jan Wagenmakers, Erroneous Analyses of Interactions in Neuroscience: A Problem of Significance, 14 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 1105, 1105 (2011) (arguing that many neuroscience studies comparing two experimental effects inappropriately focus on "the difference between their significance levels" instead of "the statistical significance of their difference")
58. Edward Vul, Christine Harris, Piotr Winkielman & Harold Pashler, Puzzlingly High Correlations in fMRI Studies of Emotion, Personality, and Social Cognition, 4 PERSP. ON PSYCHOL. SCI. 274, 279 (2009) (arguing that many fMRI studies report artificially high correlations by committing " nonindependence errors" in their statistical analysis).
59. See generally WALTER GLANNON, BIOETMCS AND THE BRAIN 76-115 (2007) (discussing current and emerging methods of pharmaceutically manipulating the brain)
60. Adam Kolber, Give Memory-Altering Drugs a Chance, 476 NATURE 275 (2011) (discussing efforts to develop memory-dampening drugs).
61. In a prior article I discussed the "experiential future" in enough detail that warrants calling it a fall-fledged prediction, as opposed to a weaker plausible hypothesis. Adam J. Kolber, The Experiential Future of the Law, 60 EMORY L.J. 585 (2011).
62. Justin E. Brown, Neil Chatterjee, Jarred Younger & Sean Mackey, Towards a Physiology-Based Measure of Pain: Patterns of Human Brain Activity Distinguish Painful from Non-Painful Thermal Stimulation, 6 PLoS ONE, at e24124 (2011).
63. Marwan N. Baliki, Paul Y. Geha, Howard L. Fields & A. Vania Apkarian, Predicting Value of Pain and Analgesia: Nucleus Accumbens Response to Noxious Stimuli Changes in the Presence of Chronic Pain, 66 NEURON 149, 149 (2010).
64. See M.N. Baliki, P.Y. Geha & A.V. Apkarian, Parsing Pain Perception Between Nociceptive Representation and Magnitude Estimation, 101 J. NEUROPHYSIOLOGY 875, 880 fig. 4 (2009)
65. Robert C. Coghill, John G. McHaffie & Ye-Fen Yen, Neural Correlates of Interindividual Differences in the Subjective Experience of Pain, 100 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. SCI. U.S. AM. 8538, 8538 (2003)
66. Andre Marquand, Matthew Howard, Michael Brammer, Carlton Chu, Steven Coen & Janaina Mouräo-Miranda, Quantitative Prediction of Subjective Pain Intensity from Whole-Brain fMRI Data Using Gaussian Processes, 49 NEUROIMAGE 2178 (2010) (using fMRI brain data and machine learning algorithms to predict the level of pain an individual subject will report from a painful stimulus).
67. Adam J. Kolber, Pain Detection and the Privacy of Subjective Experience, 33 AM. J.L. & MED. 433, 436-37 (2007).
68. See Howard J. Aizenstein, Carmen Andreescu, Kathryn L. Edelman, Jennifer L. Cochran, Julie Price, Meryl A. Butters, Jordan Karp, Meenal Patel & Charles F. Reynolds III, fMRI Correlates of White Matter Hyperintensities in Late-Life Depression, 168 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1075, 1080 (2011)
69. Sonia J. Lupien, Alexandra Fiocco, Nathalie Wan, Francoise Maheu, Catherine Lord, Tania Schramek & Mai Thanh Tu, Stress Hormones and Human Memory Function Across the Lifespan, 30 PSYCHONEUROENDOCRINOLOGY 225, 238 (2005) ("[C]hronic exposure to elevated levels of [hormones released when a person experiences stress] is related to both memory impairments and a smaller volume of the hippocampus.")
70. Yvette I. Sheline, Milan Sanghavi, Mark. A. Mintun & Mokhtar H. Gado, Depression Duration but Not Age Predicts Hippocampal Volume Loss in Medically Healthy Women with Recurrent Major Depression, 19 J. NEUROSCIENCE 5034, 5039 (1999) (reporting "smaller hippocampal volumes in subjects with a history of depression").
71. Richard J. Davidson, John R. Marshall, Andrew J. Tomarken & Jeffrey B. Henriques, While a Phobic Waits: Regional Brain Electrical and Autonomic Activity in Social Phobics During Anticipation of Public Speaking, 47 BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY 85, 85 (2000) ("[Social p]hobics showed a marked increase in right-sided activation in the anterior temporal and lateral prefrontal scalp regions.").
72. See, e.g., Vince D. Calhoun, Paul K. Maciejewski, Godfrey D. Pearlson & Kent A. Kiehl, Temporal Lobe and "Default" Hemodynamic Brain Modes Discriminate Between Schizophrenia and Bipolar Disorder, 29 HUM. BRAIN MAPPING 1265 (2008)
73. Katharina Domschke & Udo Dannlowski, Imaging Genetics of Anxiety Disorders, 53 NEUROIMAGE 822 (2010)
74. Mary L. Phillips & Eduard Vieta, Identifying Functional Neuroimaging Biomarkers of Bipolar Disorder: Toward DSM-V, 33 SCHIZOPHRENIA BULL. 893 (2007).
75. John J. Kircher, The Four Faces of Tort Law: Liability for Emotional Harm, 90 MARQ. L. REV. 789, 810, 815-16 (2007).
76. See, e.g., Johnson v. Sampson, 208 N.W. 814, 815-16 (Minn. 1926) (allowing a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress but warning of "trumped-up" claims that rely on "subjective symptoms").
77. Kolber, supra note 99; Kolber, supra note 108. On the same topic, see Betsy J. Grey, Neuroscience and Emotional Harm in Tort Law: Rethinking the American Approach to Free-Standing Emotional Distress Claims, in LAW AND NEUROSCIENCE 203 (Michael Freeman ed., 2011).
78. See, e.g., Kendrick N. Kay, Thomas Naselaris, Ryan J. Prenger & Jack L. Gallant, Identifying Natural Images from Human Brain Activity, 452 NATURE 352 (2008)
79. Thomas Naselaris, Ryan J. Prenger, Kendrick N. Kay, Michael Oliver & Jack L. Gallant, Bayesian Reconstruction of Natural Images from Human Brain Activity, 63 NEURON 902 (2009).
80. See, e.g., Shinji Nishimoto, An T. Vu, Thomas Naselaris, Yuval Benjamin, Bin Yu & Jack L. Gallant, Reconstructing Visual Experiences from Brain Activity Evoked by Natural Movies, 21 CURRENT BIOLOGY 1641 (2011).
81. Bettina Sorger, Joel Reithler, Brigitte Dahmen & Rainer Goebel, A Real-Time fMRI-Based Spelling Device Immediately Enabling Robust Motor-Independent Communication, 22 CURRENT BIOLOGY 1333 (2012).
82. Jack Gallant, Professor of Psychology, Univ. of Cal. Berkeley, Remarks at SciFoo Conference (Aug. 5, 2012). Gallant predicts that early attempts will be only modestly successful, "but some time in the further future, it will work well enough to be useful." E-mail from Jack Gallant, to author (Aug. 24, 2012) (on file with author).
83. Anthony Wagner, Can Neuroscience Identify Lies?, in A JUDGE'S GUIDE TO NEUROSCIENCE: A CONCISE INTRODUCTION 13, 13-14 (Michael S. Gazzaniga & Jed S. Rakoff eds, 2010).
84. For one study that does an impressive job of studying lies in a more real-world context, see Joshua D. Greene & Joseph M. Paxton, Patterns of Neural Activity Associated with Honest and Dishonest Moral Decisions, 106 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. SCI. U.S. AM. 12, 506 (2009).
85. Frederick Schauer, Lie-Detection, Neuroscience, and the Law of Evidence 18 (Oct. 22, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn. com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=2165391.
86. Giorgio Ganis, J. Peter Rosenfeld, John Meixner, Rogier A. Kievit & Haline E. Schendan, Lying in the Scanner: Covert Countermeasures Disrupt Deception Detection by Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging, 55 NEUROIMAGE 312, 312 (2011).
87. See CEPHOS, http://www.cephoscorp.com/lie-detection/index.php
88. No LIE MRI, http://noliemri.com.
89. United States v. Semrau, 693 F.3d 510, 516 (6th Cir. 2012) (affirming exclusion of allegedly exculpatory fMRI lie detection evidence under Federal Rules of Evidence 403 and 702)
90. Wilson v. Corestaff Servs. L.P., 900 N.Y.S.2d 639, 642 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010) (excluding fMRI lie detection evidence in an employment discrimination case principally on the ground that witness credibility is a jury question).
91. Frederick Schauer, Neuroscience, Lie-Detection, and the Law, 14 TRENDS IN COGNITIVE SCI. 101, 101 (2009).
92. See Charles F. Bond, Jr. & Bella M. DePaulo, Individual Differences in Detecting Deception: Accuracy and Bias, 134 PSYCHOL. BULL. 477, 477 (2008) (stating the "consensus among psychologists" that "people are not very accurate at detecting deception").
93. Michael G. Aamodt & Heather Custer, Who Can Best Catch a Liar? A Meta-Analysis of Individual Differences in Detecting Deception, 15 FORENSIC EXAMINER 6, 9-10 (2006).
94. Id. at 313 (quoting United States v. Barnard, 490 F.2d 907, 912 (9th Cir. 1973)) (emphasis in original).
95. Jorge Ponseti, Oliver Granert, Olav Jansen, Stephan Wolff, Klaus Beier, Janina Neutze, Günther Deuschl, Hubertus Mehdorn, Hartwig Siebner & Hartmut Bosinski, Assessment of Pedophilia Using Hemodynamic Brain Response to Sexual Stimuli, 69 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 187 (2011).
96. Jorge Ponseti, Oliver Granert, Olav Jansen, Stephan Wolff, Hubertus Mehdom, Hartmut Bosinski & Hartwig Siebner, Assessment of Sexual Orientation Using the Hemodynamic Brain Response to Visual Sexual Stimuli, 6 J. SEXUAL MED. 1628 (2009).
97. See generally William A. Cunningham, Marcela K. Johnson, Carol L. Raye, Chris Gatenby, John C. Gore & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Separable Neural Components in the Processing of Black and White Faces, 15 PSYCHOL. SCI. 806 (2004)
98. Elizabeth A. Phelps, Kevin J. O'Connor, William A. Cunningham, E. Sumie Funayama, J. Christopher Gatenby, John C. Gore & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Performance on Indirect Measures of Race Evaluation Predicts Amygdala Activation, 12 J. COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE 729 (2000)
99. Mary E. Wheeler & Susan T. Fiske, Controlling Racial Prejudice and Stereotyping: Social-Cognitive Goals Affect Amygdala and Stereotype Activation, 16 PSYCHOL. SCI. 56 (2005).
100. Ivan Martinovic, Doug Davies, Mario Frank, Daniele Pento, Tomas Ros & Dawn Song, On the Feasibility of Side-Channel Attacks With Brain-Computer Interfaces 13 (August 8-10, 2012) (21st Usenix Security Symposium Conference Paper), available at https://www.usenix.org/system/files/conference/ usenixsecurity12/sec12-final56.pdf.
101. See Employee Polygraph Protection Act, 29 U.S.C §§ 2001-2009 (2006) (limiting most uses of the polygraph in civilian employment).
102. For one call to begin regulating brain-based lie detection, see Henry T. Greely & Judy Illes, Neuroscience-Based Lie Detection: The Urgent Need for Regulation, 33 AM. J. L. & MED. 377 (2007).
103. See, e.g., Stewart Baker, Privacy's Memory Lane: From Furor to Fail in Eight Years, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Aug. 19, 2009, 1:17 PM), http://www.volokh.cora/ 2012/08/19/privacys-memory-lane-from-furor-to-fail-in-eight-years.
104. There continues to be much debate over the accuracy of polygraphs. See, e.g., Joseph R. Simpson, Functional MRI Lie Detection: Too Good to Be True?, 36 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 491, 491 (2008) ("Estimates of [polygraph] accuracy range from a high of 95 percent to a low of 50 percent, with the best estimate probably around 75 percent sensitivity and 65 percent specificity." (footnotes omitted)).
105. See, e.g., 2001: A Disappointment?, ECONOMIST, Dec. 22, 2001, at 106, available at http://www.economist.com/node/883645 ("After half a century of frustrations and deadends, AI research has become famous not for success, but for failure.").
106. See, e.g., Walter Mossberg, The iPhone Finds Its Voice - Features in the 4S Include a System That Answers Questions Out Loud and Learns a User's Speech, WALL ST. J., Oct. 12, 2011, at D1.
107. John Markoff, Computer Wins on 'Jeopardy!': Trivial, It's Not, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 2011, at A1.
108. See, e.g., Gary Marcus, Why Can't My Computer Understand Me?, NEW YORKER BLOG, (Aug. 16, 2013), http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/elements/2013/08/ why-cant-my-computer-understand-me.html.
109. Burkhard Bilger, Auto Correct, NEW YORKER, NOV. 25, 2013, at 106
110. John Markoff, Look Officer, No Hands: Google Car Drives Itself, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 2010, at A1
111. Rebecca J. Rosen, Google's Self-Driving Cars: 300,000 Miles Logged, Not a Single Accident Under Computer Control, ATLANTIC (Aug. 9, 2012, 12:29 PM), http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2012/08/googles-self-driving-cars- 300-000-miles-logged-not-a-single-accident-under-computer-control/260926.
112. See, e.g., Tom Vanderbilt, Let the Robot Drive, WIRED, Feb. 2012, at 86, 88-90, available at http://www.wired.com/magazine/2012/01/ff-autonomouscars.
113. Dan Strumpf, Liability Issues Create Potholes on the Road to Driverless Cars, WALL ST. J, Jan. 27, 2013, at B1.
114. See Amy Lee, Autonomous Vehicle Law Passes in Nevada: Driverless Cars Could Hit the Road in 2012, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 24, 2011, 6:12 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/06/24/autonomous-vehicle-law-nevada-n-884307. html
115. see also Bill No. 511, 76th Assemb. (Nev. 2011), http://www.leg.state.nv. us/Session/76th2011/Bills/AB/AB511-EN.pdf.
116. Automated Driving: Legislative and Regulatory Action, CTR. FOR INTERNET & Soc'y, http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/wiki/index.php/Automated-Driving:- Legislative-and-Regulatory-Action.
117. Hal Hodson, AI Gets Involved with the Law, NEW SCIENTIST (May 17, 2013), http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg21829175.900-ai-gets-involved-with-the- law.html#.UpJbKsRwrzg.
118. On some of the obstacles, see generally James Franklin, How Much of Commonsense and Legal Reasoning is Formalizable? A Review of Conceptual Obstacles, 11 L., PROBABILITY & RISK 225 (2012) (discussing difficulties computers have in understanding context, conditionals, counterfactuals, degrees of similarity, and more).
119. Geeta Dayal, The Algorithmic Copyright Cops: Streaming Video's Robotic Overlords, WIRED (Sept. 6th, 2012, 6:00 AM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/ 2012/09/streaming-videos-robotic-overlords-algorithmic-copyright-cops/all/.
120. See, e.g., Philippa Foot, The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of Double Effect, in VIRTUES AND VICES AND OTHER ESSAYS IN MORAL PHILOSOPHY 19, 23 (1978)
121. Judith Jarvis Thomson, The Trolley Problem, 94 YALE L.J. 1395 (1985).
122. See generally Nick Paumgarten, Here's Looking at You: Should We Worry About the Rise of the Drone?, NEW YORKER, May 14, 2012, at 46.
123. See, e.g., Patrick Lin, The Ethics of Saving Lives with Autonomous Cars are Far Murkier Than You Think, WIRED (July 30, 2013, 6:30 AM), http://www.wired.com/opinion/2013/07/the-surprising-ethics-of-robot-cars/.