How folk beliefs about free will influence sentencing: A new target for the neuro-determinist critics of criminal law

New Criminal Law Review

Volumn 16, Issue 3, 2013, Pages 449-493

  Atiq, Emad H ^a  

^a PRINCETON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Criminal responsibility; Determinism; Free will; Mitigation; Neuroscience

Indexed keywords

EID: 84880885640     PISSN: 19334192     EISSN: 19334206     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1525/nclr.2013.16.3.449     Document Type: Article

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