Bridging the gap between bayesian and story-comparison models of juridical inference

Law, Probability and Risk

Volumn 13, Issue 1, 2014, Pages 47-64

  Spottswood, Mark ^a  

^a FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Abduction; Associative; Bayesian; Bias; Coherence; Connectionist; Dual process; Effortful; Fact finding; Inference; Prejudice; Probabilistic; Semantic; Story comparison; System 1; System 2; Unconscious

Indexed keywords

EID: 84897782624     PISSN: 14708396     EISSN: 1470840X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/lpr/mgt010     Document Type: Article

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