Reversing property rights: Practice-based approaches for controlling agricultural nonpoint-source water pollution when emissions aggregate nonlinearly

American Journal of Agricultural Economics

Volumn 96, Issue 2, 2014, Pages 397-419

  Rabotyagov, Sergey S ^a   Valcu, Adriana M ^b   Kling, Catherine L ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON   (United States)

^b IOWA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

agricultural conservation practices; agricultural nonpoint source pollution; conservation policy; cost effective policy design; evolutionary algorithms; multi objective optimization; performance standards; water quality trading

Indexed keywords

AGRICULTURAL EMISSION; ALGORITHM; CONSERVATION MANAGEMENT; MULTIOBJECTIVE PROGRAMMING; NONPOINT SOURCE POLLUTION; PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT; POLICY APPROACH; POLLUTION CONTROL; PROPERTY RIGHTS; WATER POLLUTION; WATER QUALITY;

BOONE RIVER; IOWA; UNITED STATES;

EID: 84896980337     PISSN: 00029092     EISSN: 14678276     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/ajae/aat094     Document Type: Article

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