Towards a richer evolutionary game theory

Journal of the Royal Society Interface

Volumn 10, Issue 88, 2013, Pages

  McNamara, John M ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF BRISTOL   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Decision process; Flexibility; Mechanism; Strategy; Variation

Indexed keywords

BIOLOGY; ECOLOGY; GAME THEORY; MECHANISMS;

DECISION PROCESS; ECOLOGICAL SETTINGS; EVOLUTIONARY GAME THEORY; FLEXIBILITY; REAL-TIME RESPONSE; SOCIAL SENSITIVITIES; STRATEGY; VARIATION;

SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS;

BEHAVIOR; COEVOLUTION; DECISION MAKING; ECOLOGY; EVOLUTIONARY GAME THEORY; HUMAN; LIFE HISTORY; MENTAL HEALTH; MODEL; OUTCOME ASSESSMENT; PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY; REVIEW; SOCIAL ADAPTATION; ARTICLE; BIOLOGICAL MODEL; EVOLUTION; FLEXIBILITY; GAME; MECHANISM; STRATEGY; VARIATION;

DECISION PROCESS; FLEXIBILITY; MECHANISM; STRATEGY; VARIATION;

BIOLOGICAL EVOLUTION; GAME THEORY; MODELS, BIOLOGICAL;

EID: 84896586307     PISSN: 17425689     EISSN: 17425662     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1098/rsif.2013.0544     Document Type: Review

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