Extreme Outcomes Sway Risky Decisions from Experience

Journal of Behavioral Decision Making

Volumn 27, Issue 2, 2014, Pages 146-156

  Ludvig, Elliot A ^a,b   Madan, Christopher R ^c,d   Spetch, Marcia L ^c  

^a PRINCETON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b Princeton University   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA   (Canada)

^d UNIVERSITY MEDICAL CENTER HAMBURG EPPENDORF   (Germany)

Author keywords

Decision context; Decisions from experience; Extreme outcomes; Framing effects; Peak end rule; Risky choice

Indexed keywords

EID: 84896315915     PISSN: 08943257     EISSN: 10990771     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1002/bdm.1792     Document Type: Article

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