Rationalizability in continuous games

Journal of Mathematical Economics

Volumn 46, Issue 5, 2010, Pages 912-924

  Arieli, Itai ^a  

^a HEBREW UNIVERSITY OF JERUSALEM   (Israel)

Author keywords

Continuous games; Rationalizability

Indexed keywords

EID: 78649634872     PISSN: 03044068     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2010.08.004     Document Type: Article

References (17)

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