Inferred classifications

Virginia Law Review

Volumn 99, Issue 7, 2013, Pages 1525-1605

  Rich, Stephen M ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA   (United States)

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EID: 84892714211     PISSN: 00426601     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Review

References (275)

1. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U. S. 701, 720 (2007) (plurality opinion) ("It is well established that when the government distributes burdens or benefits on the basis of individual racial classifications, that action is reviewed under strict scrutiny.");
2. Johnson v. California, 543 U. S. 499, 505 (2005) ("We have insisted on strict scrutiny in every context, even for so-called 'benign' racial classifications....");
3. see also Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U. S. 200, 222 (1995) ("[T]he Fourteenth Amendment requires strict scrutiny of all race-based action by state and local governments.").
4. Washington v. Davis, 426 U. S. 229, 239 (1976) ("[O]ur cases have not embraced the proposition that a law or other official act, without regard to whether it reflects a racially discriminatory purpose, is unconstitutional solely because it has a racially disproportionate impact.");
5. see also Pers. Admin. v. Feeney, 442 U. S. 256, 272 (1979) ("[E]ven if a neutral law has a disproportionately adverse effect upon a racial minority, it is unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause only if that impact can be traced to a discriminatory purpose.");
6. Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Corp., 429 U. S. 252, 265 (1977) ("Proof of racially discriminatory intent or purpose is required to show a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.").
7. U. S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1;
8. see also, e.g., Louis Michael Seidman, Constitutional Law: Equal Protection of the Laws 37 (2003) ("[T]he formal structure of equal protection review can be stated quite simply:... Laws or government policies are subject to [heightened] scrutiny when they facially discriminate along suspect lines like race or gender.... Facially neutral laws face heightened review only when they are motivated by the desire to harm the group disadvantaged by them.");
9. Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of Status-Enforcing State Action, 49 Stan. L. Rev. 1111, 1113 (1997) (referring to this framework as the "prevailing view" of equal protection doctrine).
10. See, e.g., Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and Anticlassification Values in Constitutional Struggles over Brown, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 1470, 1542-44 (2004) [hereinafter Equality Talk] (observing indeterminacy in the meaning of racial classification in cases involving racial census data collection and racial profiling by law enforcement where courts declined to find racial classifications);
11. see also Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, The American Civil Rights Tradition: Anticlassification or Antisubordination?, 58 U. Miami L. Rev. 9, 16-17 (2003) (noting differences between cases finding racial classifications when race is considered as one factor among many in affirmative action cases and cases finding no classification when race is considered as a factor in "adoption placements or suspect descriptions");
12. Richard A. Primus, Equal Protection and Disparate Impact: Round Three, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 493, 509 (2003) (hypothesizing that "express racial classification" may "function[] as a term of art that encompasses a mix of descriptive and normative elements").
13. See, e.g., Parents Involved, 551 U. S. at 735 (faulting the defendant school districts for having used "explicit racial classifications" without adequate consideration of "workable race-neutral alternatives" (internal quotation marks omitted));
14. Adarand, 515 U. S. at 213 (distinguishing between "classifications based explicitly on race", which deserve strict scrutiny, and facially neutral legislation motivated by a racially discriminatory purpose which would "present[]... additional difficulties");
15. see also Rebecca L. Brown, Liberty, the New Equality, 77 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 1491, 1542 (2002) ("As long as the law does not explicitly classify, we generally do not consider any resulting inequality to be of constitutional concern. "); Primus, supra note 4, at 505 (observing that a "commonsense conception" that racial classifications must be "express" would find such classifications exist "only if such a requirement appeared in the plain text of the law").
16. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U. S. 630, 646, 650 (1993).
17. Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U. S. 457, 484-87 (1982).
18. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court's ordinary practice of raising the level of scrutiny only for explicitly classificatory measures, as opposed to measures from which a classification may be inferred, transcends its race jurisprudence. See, e.g., Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U. S. 484, 496 & n. 20 (1974) (holding that California's exclusion of pregnancy-related disability from insurance coverage did not constitute sex-based classification, notwithstanding that "only women can become pregnant"). This Article focuses on race in order to consider with some detail the possible impact of inferring racial classifications on the constitutionality of formally race neutral alternatives to affirmative action.
19. See, e.g., Michelle Adams, Is Integration a Discriminatory Purpose?, 96 Iowa L. Rev. 837, 870 (2011) ("The Court's preference for race-neutral alternatives designed to achieve the same ends as racial-classification schemes indicates its acceptance of the underlying objectives of many affirmative-action plans and integration more generally.");
20. R. Richard Banks, The Benign-Invidious Asymmetry in Equal Protection Analysis, 31 Hastings Const. L. Q. 573, 579-81 (2003) (discussing lower court decisions finding that race neutral affirmative action does not require strict scrutiny and discussing additional reasons why the contrary conclusion is unlikely);
21. Kathleen M. Sullivan, After Affirmative Action, 59 Ohio St. L. J. 1039, 1047-52 (1998) (defending the constitutionality of race neutral affirmative action on the ground that such measures do not run afoul of discriminatory purpose doctrine).
22. See, e.g., Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Strict Scrutiny of Facially Race-Neutral State Action and the Texas Ten Percent Plan, 53 Baylor L. Rev. 289, 292 (2001) (arguing that a "legislative motive to increase the percentage of one racial group in a state university at the expense of another" is "unconstitutional");
23. Kenneth L. Marcus, The War Between Disparate Impact and Equal Protection, 2008-2009 Cato Sup. Ct. Rev. 53, 73 (arguing that strict scrutiny should apply to facially neutral measures if "racial motivations predominated");
24. see also Ian Ayres, Narrow Tailoring, 43 UCLA L. Rev. 1781, 1791-92 (1996) (arguing that strict scrutiny should apply to race-neutral affirmative action under discriminatory purpose doctrine);
25. Kim Forde-Mazrui, The Constitutional Implications of Race-Neutral Affirmative Action, 88 Geo. L. J. 2331, 2333 (2000)
26. Reva B. Siegel, From Colorblindness to Antibalkanization: An Emerging Ground of Decision in Race Equality Cases, 120 Yale L. J. 1278, 1293 (2011).
27. Strict scrutiny requires that racial classifications be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling interest. See, e.g., Adarand, 515 U. S. at 227.
28. 539 U. S. 306 (2003).
29. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013).
30. 551 U. S. 701 (2007).
31. See Neil S. Siegel, The Virtue of Judicial Statesmanship, 86 Tex. L. Rev. 959, 1005 (2008) (referring to Justice Kennedy's opinion as "the law of the land" because it is the narrowest opinion supporting the Court's judgment).
32. Parents Involved, 551 U. S. at 788-89. For a longer discussion of Justice Kennedy's Parents Involved concurrence, see infra Subsection II. B.2.
33. See, e.g., Doe ex rel. Doe v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 665 F.3d 524, 544-45 n. 32, 555-56 (3d Cir. 2011) (finding Justice Kennedy's prediction that facially neutral race conscious pro-integration measures would be "unlikely" to require strict scrutiny dicta, but nevertheless holding that a school district's facially neutral districting practices did not warrant strict scrutiny even though, in designing the districting plan, the district considered the racial balance of its schools);
34. see also N. N. ex rel. S. S. v. Madison Metro. Sch. Dist., 670 F. Supp. 2d 927, 937 (W. D. Wis. 2009) (finding Justice Kennedy's concurrence to be controlling "to the extent it represents 'the narrowest grounds' for invalidating the two plans"
35. (quoting Grutter, 539 U. S. at 325)).
36. See generally John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review 135-79 (1980);
37. see also Bertrall L. Ross II, The Representative Equality Principle: Disaggregating the Equal Protection Intent Standard, 81 Fordham L. Rev. 175, 223 (2012) (discussing the continued importance of Ely's representation-reinforcing theory in understanding equal protection doctrine). Ely's representation- reinforcing theory of equal protection explains that exacting judicial review is an instrument of process perfection, invalidating laws when the people's representatives "chok[e] off the channels of political change" to benefit entrenched majorities or "systematically disadvantag[e] some minority out of simple hostility or a prejudiced refusal to recognize commonalities of interest."
38. See, e.g., Ian F. Haney López, "A Nation of Minorities": Race, Ethnicity, and Reactionary Colorblindness, 59 Stan. L. Rev. 985, 987 (2007) ("[T]he Supreme Court in the last three decades has moved ever closer to a full embrace of an anticlassification or colorblind conception of the Equal Protection Clause.").
39. But see Siegel, Equality Talk, supra note 4, at 1532-46 (demonstrating that antisubordination values continue to play an important role in equality law); see also infra Section II. A (arguing that anticlassification need not require colorblindness).
40. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U. S. 200, 223-24 (1995);
41. It also forbids courts from practicing greater and lesser variants of strict scrutiny just based on the judgment that evidence of a racial classification is more obvious in some cases than in others, see, for example, Shaw v. Reno, 509 U. S. 630, 646 u (1993) ("The difficulty of proof, of course, does not mean that a racial gerrymander, once established, should receive less scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause than other state legislation classifying citizens by race."), or that the government's motivation for using racial classifications is sympathetic in some cases and not in others
42. see, for example, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U. S. 306, 393-94 (2003) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (chastising the majority for "deferring to the law schools' choice of minority admissions programs" and warning that "[d]eference is antithetical to strict scrutiny").
43. In the latter circumstance, any search for an invidious purpose must initially proceed by rationality review, though finding an invidious purpose may justify the application of heightened scrutiny. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U. S. 229, 239 (1976).
44. Rational basis review describes the default mode of deferential review used by courts in constitutional cases, and it is often explained as an expression of judicial restraint. See Larry D. Kramer, The People Themselves: Popular Constitutionalism and Judicial Review 219 (2004) (describing the default rule of "rational basis scrutiny" as "a rule of judicial restraint, not substantive constitutional law");
45. Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Equal Protection by Law: Federal Antidiscrimination Legislation After Morrison and Kimel, 110 Yale L. J. 441, 463 (2000) ("The doctrine of rational basis review specifies the 'judicial restraint' that courts should exercise in responding to claims of invidious discrimination. "). Consistent with the colorblind constitutionalism currently practiced by the Supreme Court, judicial restraint cannot be observed if courts may raise the level of scrutiny applied in constitutional cases at will.
46. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U. S. 515, 568 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("I have no problem with a system of abstract tests such as rational basis, intermediate, and strict scrutiny (though I think we can do better than applying strict scrutiny and intermediate scrutiny whenever we feel like it).").
47. Adarand, 515 U. S. at 213.
48. Some foundational cases in equal protection jurisprudence assume this equation. See, e.g., Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U. S. 81, 100 (1943) ("Distinctions between citizens solely because of their ancestry are by their very nature odious to a free people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality.").
49. U. S. Const. amend. XV, § 1
50. 238 U. S. 347 (1915).
51. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U. S. 190, 197-99 (1976) (applying heightened scrutiny to classification based on sex);
52. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 365, 376 (1971) (applying strict scrutiny to classification based on alienage).
53. U. S. Const. amend. XV, § 1.
54. Shaw, 509 U. S. at 644 (alteration in original)
55. (quoting Guinn, 238 U. S. at 363).
56. Guinn, 238 U. S. at 364.
57. 528 U. S. 495 (2000).
58. See, e.g., Tom Dye, Population Trends in Hawai'i Before 1778, 28 Haw. J. Hist. 1, 13-15 (1994);
59. see also Rice, 528 U. S. at 514
60. Rice, 528 U. S. at 523.
61. 458 U. S. 457 (1982).
62. (quoting James v. Valtierra, 402 U. S. 137, 141 (1971)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
63. 393 U. S. 385 (1969).
64. quoted in Hunter, 393 U. S. at 387.
65. Hunter, 393 U. S. at 390;
66. See, e.g., Adarand, 515 U. S. at 207
67. Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U. S. 469, 478 (1989)
68. Hunter, 393 U. S. at 390
69. Hunter, 393 U. S. at 391
70. (citing Anderson v. Martin, 375 U. S. 399 (1964)).
71. ("[T]he State may no more disadvantage any particular group by making it more difficult to enact legislation in its behalf than it may dilute any person's vote or give any group a smaller representation than another of comparable size." (citing Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533 (1964);
72. Avery v. Midland Cnty., 390 U. S. 474 (1968)).
73. U. S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
74. 426 U. S. 229 (1976).
75. see also Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Corp., 429 U. S. 252, 266 (1977)
76. Davis, 426 U. S. at 242.
77. Arlington Heights, 429 U. S. at 266.
78. Wash. Rev. Code. § 28A.26.010 (1981)
79. quoted in Seattle Sch. Dist., 458 U. S. at 462.
80. Seattle Sch. Dist., 458 U. S. at 462.
81. see also Parents Involved, 551 U. S. at 807-13 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (describing Seattle's long history of combating racial isolation in its public schools, including its formulation of the Seattle Plan, which "achieved the integration that it had sought").
82. Seattle Sch. Dist., 458 U. S. at 461
83. Seattle Sch. Dist., 458 U. S. at 485
84. Seattle Sch. Dist., 458 U. S. at 486
85. (quoting United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U. S. 144, 153 n. 4 (1938)).
86. 458 U. S. 527 (1982).
87. Hunter, 393 U. S. at 391.
88. Seattle Sch. Dist., 458 U. S. at 472
89. Seattle Sch. Dist., 458 U. S. at 474 (emphasis added)
90. (quoting Hunter, 393 U. S. at 395 (Harlan, J., concurring)).
91. 509 U. S. 630 (1993).
92. Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437
93. (codified as amended at 42 U. S. C. § 1971-74 (e) (2006)).
94. Shaw, 509 U. S. at 658.
95. see also Heather K. Gerken, Understanding the Right to an Undiluted Vote, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 1663, 1695-96 (2001)
96. Shaw, 509 U. S. at 646 (second emphasis added).
97. (quoting Shaw v. Barr, 808 F. Supp. 461, 472 (E. D. N. C. 1992)).
98. The Court concluded that the vote dilution framework established by United Jewish Organizations of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U. S. 144(1977), did not apply to an "analytically distinct claim that a reapportionment plan rationally cannot be understood as anything other than an effort to segregate citizens into separate voting districts on the basis of race without sufficient justification. "
99. Shaw, 509 U. S. at 652.
100. Shaw, 509 U. S. at 646-47 (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted).
101. 429 U. S. 252 (1977).
102. 442 U. S. 256 (1979).
103. Shaw, 509 U. S. at 643
104. (quoting Arlington Heights, 429 U. S. at 266);
105. (quoting Feeney, 442 U. S. at 272)).
106. 429 U. S. at 266
107. 509 U. S. at 644
108. Pamela S. Karlan, Easing the Spring: Strict Scrutiny and Affirmative Action After the Redistricting Cases, 43 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1569, 1582 (2002)
109. Feeney, 442 U. S. at 279.
110. See Siegel, Equality Talk, supra note 4, at 1536-37 n. 227 (stating that Feeney "define[s] discriminatory purpose as involving a mental state akin to malice");
111. see also Ian Haney-Lopez, Intentional Blindness, 87 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 1779, 1826 (2012)
112. 364 U. S. 339 (1960).
113. Shaw, 509 U. S. at 645.
114. 488 U. S. 469 (1989).
115. Shaw, 509 U. S. at 653 (emphasis added);
116. see also Croson, 488 U. S. at 493 ("Absent searching judicial inquiry into the justification for such race-based measures, there is simply no way of determining what classifications are 'benign' or 'remedial' and what classifications are in fact motivated by illegitimate notions of racial inferiority or simple racial politics.").
117. Shaw, 509 U. S. at 653.
118. 442 U. S. at 274.
119. Richard H. Pildes & Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Harms, "Bizarre Districts", and Voting Rights: Evaluating Election-District Appearances After Shaw v. Reno, 92 Mich. L. Rev. 483, 506-10 (1993).
120. See, e.g., Feeney, 442 U. S. at 281 (Stevens, J., concurring) (opining that "the question whether [a classification "not overtly based on gender"] is covertly gender based is the same as the question whether its adverse effects reflect invidious gender-based discrimination" and proposing that "[h]owever the question is phrased", it may "largely" be answered by the same statistical proof).
121. see also Arlington Heights, 429 U. S. at 266-68 (setting forth several factors that may support a finding of discriminatory purpose, including the impact of the legislation and "procedural" and "substantive" departures from the government's ordinary decisionmaking practices).
122. Shaw, 509 U. S. at 638.
123. See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U. S. 900, 915-16 (1995)
124. See, e.g., Bush v. Vera, 517 U. S. 952, 958 (1996) (reiterating that "[s]trict scrutiny does not apply merely because redistricting is per-
125. Arlington Heights, 426 U. S. at 266.
126. Shaw 509 U. S. at 646.
127. Feeney, 442 U. S. at 279.
128. 429 U. S. at 266-67.
129. Shaw, 509 U. S. at 635 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). However, it also would have endangered the seats of incumbent Democratic congressmen serving from districts already located in that region. "[T]he Democratically controlled General Assembly rejected plans offered by both Republicans and nonpartisan groups, "
130. see Shaw v. Barr, 808 F. Supp. 461, 464 n. 3 (E D. N. C. 1992), as well as the plan offered by the Attorney General. In fact, the Republican Party of North Carolina launched an unsuccessful gerrymandering suit against the plan challenged in Shaw, alleging that it was "motivated essentially by an intent to protect Democratic incumbents." Id. Accordingly, the assembly's intention to create a majority-minority district was a direct consequence of the Attorney General's objections to the original reapportionment plan. The decision, however, to place the plan in the northern region of the state, requiring that the assembly violate established norms of compactness and contiguity in order to achieve majority-minority status, was motivated by partisan competition between political parties.
131. When the case returned to the Supreme Court following further proceedings, the Court affirmed the district court's decision to apply strict scrutiny as consistent with the "predominant factor" test of Miller v. Johnson, 515 U. S. at 915-16, because the government had conceded its "overriding purpose" to comply with the Attorney General's demands and "to create two congressional districts with effective black voting majorities."
132. Shaw v. Hunt (Shaw II), 517 U. S. 899, 906 (1996) (internal quotation marks omitted). After Shaw II invalidated the plan, the state assembly enacted a new plan that also was challenged as a racial gerrymander.
133. Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U. S. 541 (1999).
134. See Shaw, 509 U. S. at 644 (citing Guinn in support and explaining that the grandfather clause challenged in that case was unconstitutional because "on its face, it could not be explained on grounds other than race").
135. 515 U. S. 200 (1995).
136. Shaw, 509 U. S. at 643
137. (citing Croson, 488 U. S. at 493 (plurality opinion)).
138. See, e.g., Adarand, 515 U. S. at 230
139. see also Rice, 528 U. S. at 517
140. Shaw, 509 U. S. at 657.
141. Shaw, 509 U. S. at 648.
142. Hunter, 393 U. S. at 390-91.
143. Shaw, 509 U. S. at 646-47.
144. See, e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U. S. 279, 298-99 (1987)
145. See, e.g., Brown v. City of Oneonta, 221 F.3d 329, 337 (2d Cir. 2000)
146. Morales v. Daley, 116 F. Supp. 2d 801, 814-15 (S. D. Tex. 2000)
147. See Parents Involved, 551 U. S. at 796 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (acknowledging the criticism that equal protection would produce an "inefficient result" if it compelled the government to pursue racially egalitarian objectives through "indirection and general policies"). If, however, racial inequality is merely a symptom of some other socioeconomic inequality, selecting for that socioeconomic factor may return efficiencies to the government's equalitydriven policies.
148. See generally Daria Roithmayr, Direct Measures: An Alternative Form of Affirmative Action, 7 Mich. J. Race & L. 1, 27-30 (2001).
149. Paul Brest, Foreword: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 5 (1976)
150. 488 U. S. 469 (1989).
151. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U. S. 306, 327 (2003)
152. Jed Rubenfeld, Affirmative Action, 107 Yale L. J. 427, 443-44 (1997).
153. 515 U. S. 200 (1995).
154. accord Parents Involved, 551 U. S. at 745-46;
155. Grutter, 539 U. S. at 327.
156. See, e.g., Adarand, 515 U. S. at 211
157. (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U. S. 448, 518-19 (1980)
158. U. S. at 545 (Stevens, J., dissenting)));
159. see also Croson, 488 U. S. at 493 (foreshadowing this view, by stating that "[c]lassifications based on race carry a danger of stigmatic harm" and that "they may in fact promote notions of racial inferiority and lead to a politics of racial hostility");
160. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 265, 298 (1978) ("[P]referential programs may only reinforce common stereotypes holding that certain groups are unable to achieve success without special protection based on a factor having no relationship to individual worth.").
161. Adarand, 515 U. S. at 230.
162. 438 U. S. 265, 299 (1978)
163. quoted in Adarand, 515 U. S. at 224-25.
164. Shaw, 509 U. S. at 643.
165. Adarand, 515 U. S. at 230
166. (citing Shaw, 509 U. S. at 643).
167. Shaw, 509 U. S. at 641-42.
168. 539 U. S. 306 (2003).
169. U. S. at 508.
170. Grutter, 539 U. S. at 340-41.
171. 438 U. S. at 318 n. 52.
172. Grutter, 539 U. S. at 334.
173. But see Siegel, Equality Talk, supra note 4, at 1540
174. For a discussion of the significance of "indirectness" in equal protection jurisprudence, see generally Paul J. Mishkin, The Uses of Ambivalence: Reflections on the Supreme Court and the Constitutionality of Affirmative Action, 131 U. Pa. L. Rev. 907, 927-28 (1983).
175. 539 U. S. at 270
176. See, e.g., Grutter, 539 U. S. at 338 (noting that the plan "seriously considers each 'applicant's promise of making a notable contribution to the class'" due to the applicant's unique personal qualities).
177. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013).
178. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 631 F.3d 213, 231 (5th Cir. 2011).
179. The circuit court also found support for its conclusions in the language of Grutter, which had stated that "the narrow tailoring inquiry... must be calibrated to fit the distinct issues raised by the use of race to achieve student body diversity in public higher education. " Grutter, 539 U. S. at 333-34
180. quoted in Fisher, 631 F.3d at 232;
181. see also Fisher, 631 F.3d at 232 ("That is, the narrow-tailoring inquiry-like the compelling-interest inquiry-is undertaken with a degree of deference to the University's constitutionally protected, presumably expert academic judgment."). This passage in Grutter was written to answer Justice Kennedy's criticism in his dissent that the Court had misapplied strict scrutiny by deferring to the University of Michigan Law School when it performed its narrow tailoring analysis.
182. See also Grutter, 539 U. S. at 334
183. Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2419, 2421.
184. Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2419
185. (quoting Grutter, 539 U. S. at 328).
186. (quoting Grutter, 539 U. S. at 337).
187. See Parents Involved, 551 U. S. at 712.
188. Chief Justice Roberts draws an uncomfortable parallel between the racial segregation invalidated in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483(1954), and the challenged assignment plans.
189. See Parents Involved, 551 U. S. at 747 (plurality opinion);
190. Chief Justice Roberts signaled as much during oral argument in the case of Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U. S. 557 (2009)
191. when the Chief Justice stated "I thought both the plurality and the concurrence in Parents Involved accepted the fact that race conscious action such as school siting or drawing district lines is-is okay, but discriminating in particular assignments is not." Transcript of Oral Argument at 54, Ricci, 557 U. S. 557 (No. 07-1428) (emphasis added).
192. See, e.g., Parents Involved, 551 U. S. at 798-99 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting the "cruel irony" of the Chief Justice's analogy)
193. Parents Involved, 551 U. S. at 788.
194. 488 U. S. at 507;
195. see also Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U. S. 267, 280 n. 6 (1986)
196. Grutter, 539 U. S. at 339.
197. The question presented in Fisher concerned whether the Court's precedents, including specifically Grutter, "permit the [university's] use of race in undergraduate admissions decisions." Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Fisher, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013) (No. 11-345).
198. Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2415-16.
199. The PAI is used in conjunction with an "Academic Index" ("AI") that reflects each applicant's test scores and prior academic performance. Id. at 2. The Top Ten Percent Law was adopted in response to the Fifth Circuit's decision in Hopwood v. Texas, which applied strict scrutiny to the University of Texas Law School's affirmative action plan and held that the law school may not use race even "as a factor" in admissions. 78 F.3d 932, 935 (5th Cir. 1996). Hopwood invalidated the racial component of the prior AI. The Supreme Court abrogated Hopwood in Grutter v. Bollinger, holding that the University of Michigan Law School's use of race as an admissions factor survived strict scrutiny because it was narrowly tailored to fulfill the law school's compelling interest in diversity.
200. 539 U. S. 306, 343 (2003). The Grutter Court noted percentage plans as race neutral alternatives to race-based affirmative action, but found them to be no impediment to a determination that the law school's plan was constitutional.
201. 539 U. S. 306 (2003).
202. Fisher, 631 F.3d at 225-26.
203. Transcript of Oral Argument at 23-25, Fisher, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013) (No. 11-345).
204. Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2420
205. (quoting Grutter, 539 U. S. at 339-40).
206. Grutter, 539 U. S. at 394 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
207. See, e.g., Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2420
208. (quoting Grutter, 539 U. S. at 337)).
209. Croson, 488 U. S. at 519 (Kennedy, J., concurring);
210. see also Parents Involved, 551 U. S. at 790 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("[I]ndividual racial classifications... may be considered legitimate only if they are a last resort to achieve a compelling interest.").
211. Grutter, 539 U. S. at 395 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
212. See Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2415
213. (concluding merely "that the Court of Appeals did not hold the University to the demanding burden of strict scrutiny articulated in Grutter and Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke").
214. 78 F.3d at 935.
215. See Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2146 (describing how African American and Latino enrollment improved after Hopwood invalidated the university's prior use of race).
216. Grutter, 539 U. S. at 343.
217. 488 U. S. at 509-10.
218. (quoting Fullilove, 448 U. S. at 518-19 (Marshall, J., concurring)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
219. See, e.g., Grutter, 539 U. S. at 340.
220. Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2433 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
221. (quoting Gratz, 539 U. S. at 304 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)).
222. see also Transcript of Oral Argument at 24
223. Fisher, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013) (No. 11-345) (Justice Ginsburg stated that "the only reason they instituted the 10 percent plan was to increase minority enrollment" and "the only way it works is if you have heavily [racially] separated schools.").
224. Parents Involved, 551 U. S. at 720;
225. Parents Involved, 551 U. S. at 789 (Kennedy, J., concurring);
226. See, e.g., Parents Involved, 551 U. S. at 796 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy refers to this notion that race may be the problem and yet impermissible in the form of the solution as "a frustrating duality of the Equal Protection Clause."
227. See, e.g., Adarand, 515 U. S. at 213 (arguing that cases "concern[ing] only classifications based explicitly on race... present[] none of the additional difficulties posed by laws that, although facially race neutral, result in racially disproportionate impact and are motivated by a racially discriminatory purpose");
228. see also Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U. S. 541, 546 (1999) (assessment of the government's motivation is "an inherently complex endeavor");
229. Arlington Heights, 429 U. S. at 266 (purpose analysis requires a "sensitive inquiry" of circumstantial and direct evidence).
230. 509 U. S. at 650, and the fact that "for too much of our history, [many have held the belief] that individuals should be judged by the color of their skin", to conclude that the majority-black district challenged in that case may promote racial stereotyping and balkanization
231. For example, Shaw suggests that voting districts should obey conventional rules of compactness and contiguity, or else the racial breakdown of a district may support the conclusion that the district was drawn along racial lines. 509 U. S. at 647. Hunter and Seattle School District suggest that governments should not subject the passage of civil rights laws to unique structural disadvantage within the political system, or else the restructuring law may be interpreted as an effort to place special burdens on the political participation of racial minorities.
232. Hunter, 393 U. S. at 391;
233. Seattle Sch. Dist., 458 U. S. at 474.
234. The two most notable examples of this phenomenon are California's Proposition 209 and Michigan's Proposal 2, both of which are amendments to the states' constitutions enacted by popular referendum that prohibit the use of race-based affirmative action by any public institution within either state. Cal. Const. art. I, § 31 (a);
235. Mich. Const. art. I, § 26.
236. BAMN v. Regents of the Univ. of Mich., 701 F.3d 466 (6th Cir. 2012)
237. cert. granted sub. nom. Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 133 S. Ct. 1633 (Mar. 25, 2013) (No. 11-345).
238. Mich. Const. art. I, § 26 (providing that public universities "shall not discriminate against, or grant preferential treatment to, any individual or group on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin in the operation of public employment, public education, or public contracting").
239. BAMN, 701 F.3d at 488.
240. Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 133 S. Ct. 1633 (Mar. 25, 2013) (No. 11-345).
241. Cf. Shaw, 509 U. S. at 646-47.
242. Parents Involved, 551 U. S. at 789 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
243. Parents Involved, 551 U. S. at 797 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
244. Shaw, 509 U. S. at 647 (addressing reapportionment).
245. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U. S. 483, 494 (1954);
246. see also Parents Involved, 551 U. S. at 788-89 (Kennedy, J., concurring);
247. Grutter, 539 U. S. at 332-33.
248. Grutter, 539 U. S. at 339-40.
249. Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2420.
250. Chief Justice Roberts observed that Seattle School District did not address the question whether the Constitution permitted the school district to resort to race-based student assignments in the absence of de jure segregation. See Parents Involved, 551 U. S. at 721 n. 10;
251. accord Seattle Sch. Dist., 458 U. S. at 472 n. 15 (noting the parties "d[id] not challenge the propriety of race-conscious student assignments for the purpose of achieving integration" and so making no ruling on that issue).
252. Parents Involved, 551 U. S. at 857 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
253. Seattle Sch. Dist., 458 U. S. at 474-75 n. 15.
254. see also Pamela S. Karlan, Foreword: Democracy and Disdain, 126 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 29 (2012) ("[T]he Roberts Court has lost faith in the democratic process, and that doubt affects its decisions in ways both large and small.").
255. Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U. S. 495, 524 (2000);
256. Fell v. Jefferson Cnty. Bd. of Educ., No. 2010-CA-001830-MR, slip op. at 10 (Ky. Ct. App. Sept. 30, 2011).
257. See Student Assignment, Jefferson Cnty. Pub. Sch. Bd. of Educ. (May 29, 2012), http://www.jefferson.kyschools.us/Board/Documents/StudentAssign.html.
258. see also Antoinette Konz, JCPS Board OKs Revised Student-Assignment Plan, Courier-J., Jan. 10, 2012, at A1.
259. See Parents Involved, 551 U. S. at 789 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (arguing that schools may consider "with candor" the racial impact of race neutral measures);
260. Croson, 488 U. S. at 526 (race neutral efforts to "'undo the effects of past discrimination'" are not subject to strict scrutiny merely because they "may well have a racially disproportionate impact"); see also supra Section I. B. The U. S. Department of Justice has issued guidance specifically endorsing the use of socioeconomic factors (such as neighborhood socioeconomic status and parental education) as race neutral criteria school districts may use in compliance with Parents Involved. See U. S. Department of Justice, Office of Civil Rights, Guidance on the Voluntary Use of Race to Achieve Diversity and Avoid Racial Isolation in Elementary and Secondary Schools (Dec. 2, 2011). The guidance includes specific recommendations, including, for example, that school districts "draw attendance zones to achieve socioeconomic diversity, recognizing that it would also help to achieve racial diversity or avoid racial isolation. "
261. Courts have found that the collection of racial census data does not violate equal protection. See e.g., Morales v. Daley, 116 F. Supp. 2d 801, 814-15 (S. D. Tex. 2000) (holding that the census collection of self-identified racial information does not violate equal protection under the Fifth Amendment);
262. Caulfield v. Bd. of Educ. City of N. Y., 583 F.2d 605, 611 (2d Cir. 1978) (upholding the collection of racial census data from public employees);
263. Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2433 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
264. (quoting Gratz, 539 U. S. at 304).
265. The Court also might rely on Adarand's distinction between race neutral socioeconomic criteria and a race-based presumption that one meets that criteria, 515 U. S. at 212-13, to find that the revised Jefferson County plan, like the affirmative action programs in Adarand and Grutter, simply uses a racial classification as one factor in its decision, thus requiring strict scrutiny. A distinction would still exist, however, between those programs that classified individuals by race and the district's plan, forcing the members of the Parents Involved majority to reconsider what they meant by "individual racial classification. "
266. Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 159. 070 (1996) (stating in pertinent part that "[w]ithin the appropriate school district attendance area, parents... shall be permitted to enroll their children in the public school nearest their home").
267. Fell, No. 2010-CA-001830-MR, slip op. at 20-22;
268. see also Court Hears JCPS Busing Case Today, Courier-J., Apr. 18, 2012, at B3 (reporting on oral argument).
269. Jefferson Cnty. Bd. of Educ. v. Fell, 391 S. W.3d 713, 729 (Ky. 2012).
270. Fell, No. 2010-CA-001830-MR, slip op. at 12.
271. Fell, No. 2010-CA-001830-MR, slip op. at 12.
272. See McClesky v. Kemp, 481 U. S. 279, 299 (1987) (declining to find the challenged capital punishment statute resulted from a discriminatory purpose because the state had "legitimate reasons" to adopt it);
273. cf. Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U. S. 217, 225 (1971) (arguing that invalidating legislation because of the government's illicit motivation is futile because "if the law is struck down for this reason, rather than because of its facial content or effect, it would presumably be valid as soon as the legislature... repassed it for different reasons").
274. Seattle Sch. Dist., 458 U. S. at 472 (1983) ("[O]ur cases suggest that desegregation of the public schools... inures primarily to the benefit of the minority....").
275. See, e.g., Hampton v. Jefferson Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 102 F. Supp. 2d 358, 377 (W. D. Ky. 2000) (the intervenors whose petition vacated the desegregation decree were parents of African American students who sought admission to a magnet school that, pursuant to the decree, was under a racial quota).